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INTRODUCTION
T HERE has always been some controversy about how oversight 
of
charities' is or should be divided between the states, the federal
government, and charities themselves. Since the beginning of their
existence, states have expressed a right and obligation under common law
and statute to oversee the operation of charities to ensure that they (and
those who control them) act consistently with their charitable missions. On
the other hand, the federal government, to the degree that it gives favorable
tax treatment to charities, has an interest in reserving such treatment only
for charities that are "worthy" of such treatment, and federal law limits the
charities that qualify for tax exemption.' The federal government ensures
compliance with federal law through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Finally, charities themselves take the biggest role in providing mechanisms
to ensure that their charitable goals are met.' This autonomy of charities'
self-governance is also important.
i Benjamin M. Leff is an assistant professor at American University-Washington Col-
lege of Law. I would like to thank Lilian Faulhaber, James Fishman, Adam Hirsch, Heather
Hughes, David Snyder, the participants at the AALS Section on Non-Profit Law and Phi-
lanthropy annual meeting, the participants at the Florida State University College of Law
Visiting Faculty Series, and the participants at the Washington College of Law Business Law
Workshop for their comments and criticisms.
2 The term "charity" will hereinafter be used generically to refer to organizations ex-
empt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. Many of the observations
contained in this Article may apply equally to non-profit organizations that are exempt from
tax under provisions other than section 501(c)(3), but will be constrained in this discussion to
501 (c)(3) organizations.
3 I.R.C. H§ 501(c)(3), 170 (West Supp. 2010).
4 Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public Is
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Recently, the IRS has increased its focus on "governance"-a series
of practices adopted by charities that have previously been perceived
to be largely the province of charities themselves or of state regulation.
The IRS's "governance initiative" is a series of programs implemented
by the IRS to identify "best practices" that are followed by the boards of
directors of well-managed charities and to "encourage" charities to adopt
such practices.' The IRS's governance initiative has been criticized as an
instance of the IRS overstepping its proper authority and interfering in
an area that either should be the province of the states, or of the charities
themselves.6 For example, James Fishman has argued that the IRS's
governance initiative is "a kind of stealth preemption, which undermines
the principles of our federal system."'
Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 581 (2010) ("Those who create and govern
foundations and other charities choose not only the charitable purposes to be served, but also
the processes by which those purposes will be fulfilled.").
5 See discussion infra Section II.
6 See James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS's Nonprofit Corporate Governance Ini-
tiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 548 (2010) (describing the IRS's recent initiatives in the area of
corporate governance as "a kind of stealth preemption, which undermines the principles of
our federal system"); see also ADVISORY COMM. ON TAx EXEMPT & Gov'T ENTITIEs (ACT), TlE
APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WITH RESPECT TO TAX-EXEMPT ORGA-
NIZATION GOOD GOVERNANCE ISSUES 6 (2oo8) [hereinafter ACT REPORT], available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege-act rpt7.pdf; Grace Allison, The Exempt Organization Division
Reports on Tax Compliance, TAX'N EXEMPTS, May-June 2009, at 12, 14 (recognizing that some
observers have cited an "absence of studies showing any correlation between governance on
the one hand and compliance on the other"); Brody & Tyler, supra note 4, at 578 (decrying the
IRS's recent governance initiatives, not because they infringe on the states' authority to regu-
late, but because they infringe on the charities' own autonomy); Thomas Silk, Good Governance
Practices for 501(c)(3) Organizations: Should the IRS Become Further Involved?, 107 J. TAX'N 45,
45 (2007) ("1 have heard many practitioners argue that governance is the sole purview of state
law, and that the IRS should stay away from the issue."); John R. Washlick, The Form 99o Pre-
paredness Assessment-Misery Loves Company, TAX'N EXEMPTS, Jan.-Feb. 2oo9, at 26, 27 ("FORM
990 now essentially imposes on exempt organizations compliance with policies that the IRS
perceives as best practices, and that it acknowledges are not required by the Code."); Bruce
Hopkins, Presentation to the Georgetown University Law Center 27th Annual Representing
& Managing Tax-Exempt Organizations Conference 8 (April 22, 201o) [hereinafter Hopkins
Outline] (copy on file with author) (The purposes of new FORM 990 are, among other things, to
"[cireate new law, such as in the realms of governance."). But see Sarah Hall Ingram, Comm'r,
Tax Exempt and Gov't Entities, IRS, Remarks at Georgetown University Continuing Legal
Education: Nonprofit Governance-The View from the IRS II (June 23, 2009) [hereinafter
Ingram 2009 Speech], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/ingram-gtown-gover-
nance-062309.pdf ("While both state regulation and sector self-regulation are important, and
I welcome and respect them, they do not get the IRS off the hook. Congress gave us a job
to do, and we cannot delegate to others our obligation to enforce conditions of federal tax
exemption. The federal tax law must be applied consistently across the country, and we will
use both our education and outreach programs and a meaningful enforcement presence to
accomplish this.").
7 Fishman, supra note 6, at 548.
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One prominent example of a governance issue on which the IRS
has focused is "board independence." An "independent" board member
is generally a person on the governing board of an organization who has
no financial interest in the organization or its activities.' The IRS claims
that it has encouraged organizations to have independent boards, but has
never required them to do so. Critics of the governance initiatives have
focused on board independence as well, arguing that "[d]espite what the
Form 1023 and its instructions suggest, the Service has denied exemptions
because of the lack of an independent board, some independent members,
or a conflict of interest policy."' Specifically, critics argue that practitioners'
reports and some published cases and rulings suggest that the IRS has
recently required organizations to include "independent" board members,
even though independent boards are not currently required under federal
law. In other words, the critics claim that the IRS is requiring charities
to have independent boards, and this requirement not only infringes on
charities' autonomy or the states' prerogatives but is actually illegal under
federal law.
If the IRS were denying tax exemption to any organization that had
a non-independent board, it would indeed be beyond its authority under
current law. The IRS would need Congress to change the law to permit
it to make such a sweeping change in the requirements for tax exemption
under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. In fact, some commentators argue that
Congress should amend the law to require that substantially all charities
have at least some independent members on their governing board. These
8 This Article borrows the definition of an "independent" director from a recent report
by a prestigious panel: independent directors are those
(I) who have not been compensated by the organization within the
past twelve months . . . except for reasonable compensation for board
service; (2) whose own compensation, except for board service, is not
determined by individuals who are compensated by the organization;
(3) who do not receive, directly or indirectly, material financial benefits
(i.e., service contracts, grants, or other payments) from the organization
except as a member of the charitable class served by the organization;
and (4) who are not related to (as a spouse, sibling, parent, or child) any
individual described above.
PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, INDEPENDENT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY
GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 75 (2005) [hereinafter INDEPEN-
DENT SECTOR], available at http://www.nasconet.org/hottopics/Panel%2oFinal%2oReport.pdf.
9 Fishman, supra note 6, at 562. See also ACT REPORT, supra note 6, at 31 ("In various
contexts, . . . [the IRS] has created a per se requirement for exemption that requires the orga-
nization be governed by an independent body. The IRS's position, however, has not always
been sustained by the courts and we are concerned about per se requirements."); Brody &
Tyler, supra note 4, at 578 ("[Ilt is understood that the Service demands a minimum of three
unrelated board members-although, because such a requirement does not appear in the
statute or regulations, the Service cannot deny exemption on this basis alone.").
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commentators include a very prestigious panel convened by Independent
Sector, and composed of numerous leaders from the tax-exempt sector.o
This Article surveys the IRS's actions, as expressed in its speeches,
training manuals, and adverse determination letters. I find that the IRS
does appear to be requiring some organizations to have independent boards,
but that it is doing so in-a sharply constrained way. It appears that the IRS
is generally only denying tax exemption when an organization (i) has a
governing board dominated by its founders; (ii) intends to engage in ongoing
financial transactions with those founders; (iii) is not a private foundation;
and (iv) has very few meaningful "independent stakeholders," such as
donors, who might monitor the organization. It appears that organizations
that meet all four of these criteria may be denied tax exemption if they
refuse to broaden their governing board to include independent directors.
This approach is a "middle way" between the IRS completely leaving
board independence to the charity itself or to state regulators and Congress
changing the law to require board independence in substantially all section
501(c)(3) charities.
The problem is that the IRS appears to be only stumbling toward this
approach. It has nowhere expressly described these limitations on its own
discretion and is not applying them in an entirely consistent manner. This
Article argues that the IRS could more effectively represent the "middle
way" if it would expressly embrace the relevance of board independence to
tax exemption and the limitations on its discretion described herein. This
middle way recognizes that the federal government has a legitimate interest
in charity board independence, but only under certain circumstances. This
Article supports the middle way because it appears to reflect current law in
representing a plausible balance of the federal interest in preventing the
diversion of tax-deductible contributions to private purposes, the states'
interests in protecting the interests of various stakeholders, and charities'
interests in their own autonomy.
In Part I, this Article reviews the IRS's "governance initiatives," as
they pertain to the issue of board independence. In Part II, it reviews
some recent adverse determination letters in which the IRS denied
applications for tax-exempt status to organizations without independent
boards. I find that these adverse determination letters do suggest that the
IRS considers board composition relevant to an initial exemption ruling,
and that there is a plausible argument that board composition is at least
sometimes relevant to a determination of tax-exempt status. In Part III, I
argue that it appears that the IRS only denies exemption to organizations
that are characterized by three constraining factors: first, these organizations
to The Independent Sector Panel recommended that federal law be changed to require
at least one-third of a public charity's governing board be composed of "independent" di-
rectors or trustees. The requirement would not apply to private foundations, churches, and
government instrumentalities. See INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 8.
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have governing boards that are completely dominated by their founders;
second these organizations have founders who plan to engage in significant
financial transactions. with the organization; and third, these organizations
are generally not private foundations.
In Part IV I address another factor that the IRS appears to be
considering in deciding which organizations should be urged (or required)
to have independent boards. Attention to this factor has the potential to
cabin the IRS's discretion still further in selecting which organizations may
need an independent board. This factor is whether the organization has any
"independent stakeholders," such as donors. None of the organizations that
were denied exemption had significant numbers of independent donors,
and the rulings exhibited an acute interest on the part of the IRS in the
lack of independent donors or other potential independent stakeholders.
The IRS is likely acting on a theory that the existence of independent
stakeholders may serve to protect against abuse by non-independent,
founder-dominated governing boards. I argue.that a more explicit focus
on third-party stakeholders would more effectively cabin IRS discretion in
this area and permit the IRS to do a better job of identifying organizations
that would likely benefit from independent board members, and which
could be required to have them.
The IRS's recognition of the relevance of independent stakeholders
other than board members has implications for the "federalism" question
as well. Section V of this Article provides sometentative thoughts about
why a more rigorous focus on independent stakeholders by the federal
government might enhance the proper.balance between federal and state
regulation of charities.
When viewed in this way, the limitations that the IRS has imposed
on its approach to requiring independent governing boards-especially its
attention to independent stakeholders-potentially provides a warrant for
federal regulation of the composition of charity boards of directors, a limit
on the extent of federal discretion, and a (highly tentative) explanation for
state lapses of regulation. The IRS must not overstep its congressionally-
created authority just because it fears that states are not doing enough
to regulate charities. On the other hand, it cannot be lax in protecting
the interests of the federal government to the degree that protection is
permitted or mandated under federal law. The limited approach described
in this Article reflects the nuanced balance of federal interests, state
regulatory authority, and charity autonomy that has long been a cornerstone
of the federal regulation of charities. In the context of calls from critics
for the IRS to stay out of a charity's boardroom and calls by reformers to
change federal law to mandate a minimum level of "independence" in
the composition of all charity boards, the cautious approach described and
advocated in this Article represents a "middle way."
20IO-20I1II 735
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I. THE IRS's GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE: Focus ON BOARD INDEPENDENCE
The IRS's so-called governance initiative refers to a collection of actions
taken by the IRS in the past half-decade focusing on the way exempt
organizations are governed. The projects involve gathering information
about organizations' governance practices and communicating "best
practices" to organizations." Such governance practices have included
conflict of interest policies, compensation policies, governing board review
of agents' actions, independent review of financial statements, investment
policies, governing board minutes, and records retention policies." But
the governance issue that the IRS has stressed the most, and the one that
is perhaps most fundamental to a charity's autonomy, is the issue of board
composition. The IRS has stated that it believes that in most circumstances
the governing board of a charity should include at least some members
who have no financial interest in the organization-members who are
"independent." 1
For the last several years, the IRS Commissioner for Tax-Exempt and
Government Entities has given public speeches emphasizing the IRS's
interest in governance issues. 14 In her 2009 comments, the Commissioner
explained that governance-including the "principle that the organization's
board should be ... independent"-was a central concern of the IRS." She
explained that the concern with governance reflects a principle that "seems
intuitively true" to her and many people that "there is a link between good
governance and tax compliance.""
While Commissioner Ingram made clear in her comments that she
believed that an independent board is relevant to an organization's tax
compliance, and therefore the IRS has a legitimate interest in board
composition, she also took pains to define the nature of the IRS's interest.
Specifically, she emphasized -that the IRS does not require boards to be
independent as a prerequisite for exemption. When an organization seeks
ii See, e.g., Governance and Related Topics-5o;(c)(3) Organizations, IRS (Feb. 4, zoo8),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance-practices.pdf.
12 Id.
13 Id. at para. 3. ("Irrespective of size, a governing board should include independent
members and should not be dominated by employees or others who are not, by their very
nature, independent individuals because of family or business relationships.").
14 See, e.g., Ingram 2oo9 Speech, supra note 6; Steven T Miller, Comm'r, Tax Exempt
and Gov't Entities, IRS, Remarks to Georgetown Law Center Seminar on Representing and
Managing Tax-Exempt Organizations (Apr. 24, 2oo8), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-tege/represent-manage-speech-o424o8.pdf; Steven T. Miller, Comm'r, Tax Exempt and
Gov't Entities, IRS, Remarks Before the Georgetown Seminar, Exempt Organizations Panel
on Nonprofit Governance (Apr. 23, 2oo8), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/gulc
governance-speech-o423o8.pdf.
15 Ingram 2009 Speech, supra note 6, at 4.
i6 Id. at 5.
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tax-exempt status, it sends a form to the IRS. 7 This form is reviewed
by the IRS Exempt Organizations Division's "determinations" agents."
Ingram stated that the IRS determinations agents "encourage applicants
for determination letters to consider incorporating some principles of good
governance into their organizing documents."" But she clarified by stating:
[I]n talking about the determination stage, I have been using the word
"consider" deliberately. We may encourage applicants to incorporate
principles of good governance into their organizational structures, and
thereby reduce their risk of something going wrong later, but we are not
requiring adherence to a particular set of rules. 20
She noted that she had heard reports of determinations agents sometimes
requiring certain specific governance policies as a condition of exemption."
In response, she announced a training program to make sure that agents
understood the IRS's position-there are no "universal and mandatory
governance principles"; but the IRS has "no intention of walking away
from governance." 2
In short, the IRS has staked out a position in its public statements that
is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, it views governance practices,
like an independent board, to be intricately connected with an exempt
organization's compliance with federal law, and so it views its role as
promoting their adoption. On the other hand, it recognizes that federal
law does not require any particular organization to have an independent
board, and so it claims that it does not require an organization to have an
independent board as a prerequisite for exemption. This uneasy position
is reflected not only in public pronouncements made by IRS personnel,
but also in the various governance initiative actions undertaken by the IRS.
A. Form 1023
Possibly the first IRS action to be associated with the contemporary
governance initiative was the re-design of the Form 1023 that was completed
for tax year 2004. Form 1023 is the application that a section 501(c)(3)
organization files in order for the IRS to recognize its exempt status.
While the Form asked no direct questions about board independence, it
did contain several "governance" questions. For example, Part V of the
new Form has several new questions, including question 5a, which asks if
17 IRS FORM 1023 (2009) [hereinafter FORM 10231.
18 See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 7.20 (2003) [hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL], available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/index.htmi.
19 Ingram 2009 Speech, supra note 6, at 6.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 14 (specifically mentioning the ACT REPORT, supra note 6).
22 Id. at i5.
20IO-201I1 737
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the organization has "adopted a conflict of interest policy consistent with
the sample conflict of interest policy in Appendix A to the instructions."23
If a "consistent" conflict of interest policy has been adopted, then the
organization is asked to provide a copy of it. 4 If none is provided, then
further questions are asked about the "procedures" the organization follows
to assure that persons with conflicts of interest will not be involved in setting
their own compensation or approving business deals with themselves."
Both the model conflict-of-interest policy and the question for
organizations that have no conflict-of-interest policy necessitate the
existence of at least some board members who have no conflict of interest
with regard to any specific transaction. Under the model conflict-of-interest
policy, board members with a financial interest in a transaction must
abstain from the discussion of, and the vote on, whether to approve the
transaction.16 If the board contains only members with an interest in any
specific transaction, then no committee of disinterested board members can
be formed, and the policy cannot be followed.27 For example, a board made
up solely of a husband, wife, and child cannot approve a compensation
arrangement with the wife consistent with the model conflict-of-interest
policy because there are no unrelated (and therefore disinterested)
board members to compose an independent committee to approve the
compensation arrangement. If interested directors abstain from the decision
to approve the compensation arrangement, the room would be empty.
Likewise, an organization with no conflict-of-interest policy presumably
cannot explain how an interested director will not be involved in approving
transactions between her and the organization if there are not other-
disinterested-directors who can make those decisions. Nonetheless, the
Form has a disclaimer following these questions that explains: "Note: A
conflict of interest policy is recommended though it is not required to
obtain exemption."" Presumably, that means that however this question is
answered, the answer should not provide grounds by itself to disqualify the
organization from exemption.
23 FORM 1023, supra note 17, at pt. V, Question Sa.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 IRS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023 app. A, at 25 (zoo6).
27 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM
L. REv. 795, 8o8 (2007) ("Maintaining a group of directors able to [review and approve trans-
actions with conflicted directors] is another benefit of requiring a majority, or at least some
critical mass, of independent directors.").
28 FORM 1023, supra note 17, at pt. V, Question 5a.
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B. Form 990
In 2008, the IRS completed a substantial re-design of its Form 990-the
annual information return filed by exempt organizations.29 The re-designed
Form 990 contained an unambiguous focus on governance, including a
new section, Part VI, called "Governance, Management and Disclosure.""3
While some of the questions in this section appeared on prior Forms 990 in
other sections, some were truly new. For the first time, the Form addressed
"board independence" explicitly, asking the organization to identify the
number of voting members of the organization's governing body who are
"independent."3  An "independent" board member, for the purposes of
the question, is defined as one who: (1) "was not compensated at any time
during the year as an officer or employee of the organization or of a related
organization"; (2) "did not.receive total compensation or other payments
exceeding $10,000 ... as an independent contractor, other than reasonable
compensation for services provided in the capacity as a member of the
governing body"; and (3) "[n]either the member, nor any family member
of the member, was involved in [an 'excess benefit transaction'] with the
organization ... for the organization's tax year."-"
An excess benefit transaction is one in which an organization provides
an improper or excessive benefit to a related person and thereby subjects the
organization to punitive excise taxes." Thus, the IRS explicitly asked about
the independence of an organization's governing body for the first time,
notwithstanding the fact that no federal law requires that an organization
have even a single "independent" member of its governing body. The
definition of "independence" adopted in the Form was apparently crafted
entirely by the IRS and is not drawn from any source of federal law.'
29 IRS FORM 990 (2009) [hereinafter FORM 990].
30 Id. at pt. VI.
31 Id. at pt. VI, Question Ib.
32 IRS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 pt. VI.A, at 17 (2009) [hereinafter FORM 990 IN-
STRUCTIONs]; see also Fishman, supra note 6, at 570. The definition of an "independent" board
member adopted in FORM 990 is relatively permissive. For example, the definition is more
permissive than the definition contained in the Independent Sector's proposal regarding
board independence in that FORM 990 considers an independent contractor who is paid less
than $io,ooo per year "independent," while the Independent Sector definition does not. See
INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 8, at 75. Likewise, FORM 990 considers a person who engag-
es in a financial transaction with the organization in which the benefit received by the person
is not excessive "independent," while the Independent Sector definition does not. Id. Both
definitions consider a board member who receives reasonable compensation for her service
on the board to be "independent." The working definition used in this Article follows the
Independent Sector definition rather than the more permissive FoRM 990 definition.
33 I.R.C. § 4 9 5 8(c)(i)(A) (West Supp. 200I) (defining excess benefit.transactions).
34 See generally FORM 990 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32.
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In the Instructions to Form 990, the IRS expressly addresses this lack
of legal mandate for an independent governing board, acknowledging
that "federal tax law generally does not mandate particular management
structures, operational policies, or administrative practices."" Nevertheless,
the Form requires an organization to answer the questions and thereby
disclose how many "independent" directors it has. 6 The Instructions
explain that "the IRS considers such policies and procedures to generally
improve tax compliance" by helping to prevent organizations from engaging
in "excess benefit transactions, inurement, operation for non-exempt
purposes, or other activities inconsistent with exempt status."" But every
organization is different, and so "it is important that each organization
consider the governance policies and practices that are most appropriate
for that organization in assuring sound operations and compliance with tax
law.""
Thus, the new Instructions to Form 990 are also ambiguous as to the IRS's
intentions. On the one hand, they express an interest in governance issues,
like board independence. They state a preference for certain governance
practices in general, although they concede that such practices may not be
appropriate for all organizations. And they imply that certain governance
practices, like an independent board, may protect an organization against
drift from its charitable mission or abuse by insiders. On the other hand,
the Instructions inform the reader that board independence is not a
requirement of federal law.
C. Determinations Training
In addition to asking about governance issues-specifically board
independence-in Form 990, the IRS instituted special training programs
for its agents regarding exempt organizations governance issues, which
also focused on board independence. The IRS has provided materials on
its website related to two distinct training programs. " One is directed at
"determinations" specialists,40 and the other is directed at "examinations"
specialists. 4' The IRS's "determinations" specialists review Forms 1023,
35 Id. at pt. VI, at 16.
3 6 Id.
37 Id.
3 8 Id.
39 IRS Training Materials--Governance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/charities/
artiele/o,,id=2o8454,oo.html (last updated June 14, 2010).
40 IRS, EO DETERMINATIONS CPE-GOVERNANCE (2009) [hereinafter Determinations
Outline], availableathttp://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tegeeo-determsgovernance.pdf;see also IRS,
EO DETERMINATIONS CPE-GOVERNANCE POWERPOINT (2009) [hereinafter Determinations
Slides], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eodeterm.gov_cpe ppt.pdf.
41 Set IRS, EO EXAM CPE-GOVERNANCE PRESENTATION (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Exam
Outline], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance-course-outline-cpe.pdf;
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and determine whether to approve an organization's initial application
for recognition of exemption.4 The "exam" function reviews existing
organizations to determine whether they are, or are still, in compliance with
federal tax law.43 In "exam," the IRS may determine that an organization no
longer warrants exemption, or it may determine that an excise tax, such as
the punitive excise taxes imposed on "excess benefit transactions," should
be imposed on it. Thus, the "determinations" training should reflect the
IRS's views about whether and to what degree governance issues like board
independence may be relevant to an organization's initial qualification for
tax-exempt status. The "exam" training should present the IRS's views
about the relevance of governance issues, like board independence, to
continued qualification for tax-exempt status.
This Article focuses on the determinations training materials. The
determinations training materials-directed at agents who review
Form 1023 and are in a position to decide whether the IRS recognizes
an organization's exempt status or not-presumably tell us more about
whether the IRS thinks that an independent board is a precondition of
exemption than the "exam" training materials. If the IRS determines that
the organization is not exempt, then the organization's only recourse is to
petition for a review of the determination in court." Therefore, the IRS
determinations specialists wield significant power over an organization
seeking exempt status. The determinations training materials consist of
two documents, a Determinations Outline and Determinations Slides.
When it comes to the issue of board independence, the Determinations
Outline expresses an acute interest in board independence. For example,
the core training part of the Outline, under the heading "IRS Areas of
Interest," includes the subheading "Composed primarily of independent
members."45  There, the Outline states that "[i]rrespective of size, a
governing board should include independent members and should not be
dominated by employees or others who are not, by their very nature,
independent individuals because of family or business relationships."" It
goes on to state that "[tihe Internal Revenue Service reviews the board
composition of charities to determine whether the board represents a broad
public interest, and to identify the potential for insider transactions that
could result in misuse of charitable assets." 47
see also IRS, EO ExAm CPE-GOVERNANCE & TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS POWERPOINT
[hereinafter 2oo9 Exam Slides], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance
training-presentation.pdf.
42 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note I8.
43 Id § 4-75-
44 I.R.C. § 503(c) (2oo6).
45 See Determinations Outline, supra note 40, at 12.
46 Id. at 12-13 (emphasis in original).
47 Id. at 13; see also id. at 18 ("The Service believes that it is very important to the long-
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The Determinations Outline also emphasizes the limitations on
possible actions by determinations personnel. It repeatedly states "[elach
organization needs to decide for itself how best to govern-one size does
not fit all," or language to that effect.8 Thus, in the determinations training
materials, the IRS has staked out basically the same uneasy position it
expressed in the Forms 1023 and 990 and in speeches: it believes that
board independence is potentially extremely important to compliance
with tax law-specifically with advancing a tax-exempt purpose, avoiding
substantially advancing private purposes, and avoiding excess benefit
transactions. However, the IRS also acknowledges that it is inappropriate
to deny an organization exempt status merely because it does not have
independent board members.
The apparent culmination of the determinations training is a section
of the Outline called "Possible Approaches to Problem Boards."'9 The
section assumes that an organization without an independent board is
a "problem."so It concedes that facts and circumstances may excuse
an organization from having an independent board and suggests that
term success and accountability of the organization that a sizable majority of the board mem-
bers be free of financial conflicts of interest. The Service suggests (but does not enforce) that
a majority of the board of a public charity should be independent.. .. ").
48 See Determinations Outline, supra note 40, at 28; see also id. at 2 ("[Olne size does
not fit all.... It is not our job to determine the organization's governance structure, policies
or practices, or to make decisions for them."); id. at 7 ("Specific governance practices should
be mandated only in rare circumstances" and "Education, implemented thoughtfully, is more
appropriate than pressuring change."); id. at ii ("Remember, One Size Does Not Fit All!");
id. at 28 ("Not our role to tell them how to govern"). In general, the Determinations Slides
contain the same information as the Determinations Outline, although the constraints on IRS
determinations actions may be even more emphasized in the Determinations Slides than in
the Determinations Outline. For example, Determinations Slide 31 contains nothing but the
cautionary statement, "Warning-these are areas of interest, NOT requirements for exemp-
tion." Determinations Slides, supra note 40, at slide 31. The Determinations Slides also have a
final section with eight true/false questions, presumably to emphasize certain aspects of what
was taught. Id: at slide 53. Of those eight questions, three ask questions about requirements
for exemption relating to board composition, all presumably emphasizing that the board com-
position requirements are generally suggestions only. For example, one question posed is,
"To obtain exemption, the IRS mandates a board must be active and engaged, appropriately
sized and composed of independent members." Id. Presumably, the correct answer to that
question is "False." Another question is, "It is very important to ensure a private foundation
has a 'community board."' Id. at slide 54. Also, presumably "False". Finally, "If an organi-
zation refuses to expand their board, the case should be closed FTE." Id. Presumably, the
answer to this question is also "False". In other words, three of the eight final questions em-
phasize the fact that the IRS is NOT mandating that all organizations have an "independent"
board in all situations. On the other hand, the final question is, "Board concerns never merit
the consideration of an audit referral." Id. The correct answer to this question is presumably
"False," emphasizing that so-called board concerns, while they should not result in a denial of
exemption, also need not result in no further IRS scrutiny.
49 See Determinations Outline, supra note 40, at 26-28.
5o Id.
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sometimes IRS "governance concerns" can be alleviated by adoption
of a conflict of interest policy." But, as was discussed above, a conflict-
of-interest policy only makes sense if the organization has at least some
members of the governing board that are not financially implicated in the
transaction, which may not be the case if all the directors are related to
each other, either familially or financially. 2 The Determinations Outline
also recommends "Audit Referral or other possible follow-up," stating that
"[glenerally, we cannot require that an organization expand its board nor
[sic] adopt a conflict of interest statement as a condition of exemption. If
an organization refuses to expand its board . . . and inurement is likely,
but cannot be proven, [a referral to examinations follow-up] should be
considered."" In other words, the lack of independent board members
should prompt a referral to the examinations function when inurement is
likely. This is a perfectly reasonable suggestion, but does not answer the
question of whether a lack of an independent board itself is evidence that
"inurement is likely" or whether the evidence of likely inurement comes
from other facts or circumstances.
Finally, the Determinations Outline proposes that lack of an
independent board may be a "Contributing Factor to an Adverse Position."4
The Outline says very little, but it does say that "a 'non-community' board
cannot be the sole factor in an adverse case," and it goes on to state that
"[tlypically, bad governance practices can be shown to highlight the control
of an organization by individuals who are receiving an undue private benefit
from the organization."
II. IS THE IRS CREATING "NEw LAw" ABOUT BOARD INDEPENDENCE?
As discussed above, there is some room for dispute about what exactly
the IRS is doing in its governance initiatives. On the one hand, it has
emphasized that board independence is an important governance practice
and that organizations should at least consider having independent board
members. On the other hand, it recognizes that "one size does not fit all"
and that it is not authorized under federal law to require organizations
to have an independent board as a precondition to obtaining exemption.
What is the nature of this "middle way" that the IRS is seeking to occupy?
Is it possible to maintain this uneasy balance between the organizational
autonomy over board composition permitted under federal law, and the
IRS's attempts to "encourage" organizations to maintain independent
boards?
51 Id. at 27.
52 See discussion supra Part I.A.
53 See Determinations Outline, supra note 4o, at 27.
54 d. at 27-28.
55 Id. at 28.
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Critics of the IRS argue that the IRS is not faithfully occupying the
middle way it describes. Rather, it is stepping over the line and coercing
organizations to adopt governance policies like an independent board.
For example, some critics have noted that the mere identification of "best
practices" by the IRS is coercive. In discussing the IRS's "suggestions"
about governance practices, one critic notes that "it would be a reckless
charity to ignore the Service's suggestions." 6  But observers of the tax-
exempt sector not only claim that the mere existence of the questions
pressures exempt organizations to adopt specific policies or procedures,"
they also claim that-notwithstanding the IRS's protestations to the
contrary-the IRS actually requires the adoption of these policies as a
precondition of exemption." There is anecdotal evidence from practitioners
who report that IRS determinations specialists have told their clients that
they must have some independent board members before their exemption
can be granted. 9 Better evidence than anecdotes are rulings published
by the IRS, and several commentators have argued that "recommended"
governance policies appear to have factored prominently in several recent
denials of exemption, especially when those recommendations involved
board independence." In effect, these critics are arguing that the IRS
56 See Fishman, supra note 6, at 56o; see also id. at 562 ("There is also the implication
that when the exemption application is reviewed, the Service will take a negative view of the
[conflict of interest] policy's absence.").
57 See, e.g., ACT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
58 See id. at 33 ("Our personal experience and research for this report suggests, however,
that specific governance practices may be required on an adhoc and inconsistent basis."); see
also id at 35 ("We are concerned about the IRS having this level of discretion in cajoling or
requiring specific governance process, particularly in the determination phase, where there
usually is no track record evidencing operational failures."); Allison, supra note 6, at 14 (noting
that some have cited the "absence of studies showing any correlation between governance on
the one hand and compliance on the other"); see, e.g., ACT REPORT, supra note 6, at 2-3; Ev-
elyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got To Do With It?, So CHI.-KErrr L. REV. 641,
648 n.17 (2005) ("The Service also reportedly looks for a certain percentage of independent
directors to balance the directors who are financially interested or related."); Silk, supra note
6, at 45 ("I have heard many practitioners argue that governance is the sole purview of state
law, and that the IRS should stay away from the issue."); Washlick,supra note 6, at 27 ("Form
990 now essentially imposes on exempt organizations compliance with policies that the IRS
perceives as best practices, and that it acknowledges are not required by the Code."); Hopkins
Outline, supra note 6, at 8.
59 See ACT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 (The authors of the Report attribute these claims
to "olur personal experience and research for this report....").
6o The critics of the IRS's governance initiatives have pointed to several recent negative
determination letters to illustrate their concerns that the IRS is requiring exempt organi-
zations to adopt governance practices relating to board independence as a precondition of
exemption. For example, Fishman lists four private letter rulings (PLR) denying exemption:
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-30-028 (Jul. 25, zoo8), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-28-029 (Jul. 1 1,
2oo8), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-24-025 (June 13, 2oo8), and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-o6-021
(Feb. 8, 2008). Fishman, supra note 6, at 563 n.58 (dates changed to reflect date of release).
The ACT REPORT lists six additional denials: I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-33-027 (Aug. 17,2007),
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is creating a "new law" with respect to board independence through its
determinations process.' The next Section examines these rulings.
The IRS has argued in speeches and in its governance initiative materials
that it is not forcing any organization to adopt any specific governance
practice-that one size does not fit all.62 The critics, on the other hand,
have pointed to a number of recent rulings and cases to argue that the IRS
has strongly urged organizations without any independent board members
to expand their board to include some, and that the IRS has then denied
exempt status to organizations that refused.63  The critics argue that the
IRS practice, as represented in the adverse rulings and cases, is the real IRS
policy, notwithstanding the IRS's express message of restraint. Therefore,
we turn to those rulings and cases to discern the IRS's policy.'
I.R.S.Tech. Adv. Mem. 2007-37-044 (Sept. 14, 2007), I.R.S.Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-36-037 (Sept. 7,
2007), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-35-029 (Sept. 2, 2005), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-14-021 (Jan.
13, 2005), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-10-031 (Mar. I I, 2oo5). ACT REPORT, Supra note 6, at 34
n.I i6 (dates changed to reflect date of release). The ACT REPORT also discusses at least one
example of a situation where the Service pushed for the organization to have a five member
independent board. See id. at 34 n. 117 (discussing the Service's position in Exploratory Re-
search, Inc. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1347 (2oo8)). Hopkins lists eight, some of which are
the same as those already cited: I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-36-037 (Sept. 7, 2007), I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 2oo7-37-o44 (Sept. 14, 2007), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-30-028 (Jul. 25, 2oo8),
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-28-029 (July 18, 20o8), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-43-032 (Oct. 24,
2oo8), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-45-053 (Nov. 7, 2008), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-46-o4o (Nov.
14, 2008), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-16-035 (Apr. 17, 2oo9). Hopkins Outline, supra note 6, at
27-28. Hopkins also discusses Ohio Disability Ass'n v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 462 (2009). Id.
61 See supra note 6o.
62 Federal law does require board independence in one very specific circumstance-for
credit counseling organizations. See Pension Protection Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. I09-280,
§I 22o(a), 120 Stat. 780, Io86; I.R.C. § 50 1 (q)(i)(D) (West Supp. 2010); see also Determinations
Outline, supra note 40, at 25-26 ("[A] majority (at least 51%) of the board members [of credit
counseling organizations] must represent the broad interests of the public."). In addition, the
IRS has for quite some time required the boards of non-profit hospitals to have some indepen-
dent board members. See ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT & Gov'T ENTITIES, IMPROVING THE
EMPLOYEE PLANS COMPLIANCE RESOLUTION SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR GREATER COMPLIANCE 4
(2oo8), available at wvw.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege..actrpt7.pdf; Determinations Outline, su-
pra note 40, at 26 ("The Service will not allow a tax-exempt hospital's board of directors to be
dominated by the medical staff physicians."). These few specific situations are quite narrow,
and are not are not addressed in this Article.
63 See supra note 6o.
64 It is very clear that attempting to draw conclusions from a small number of adverse
rulings is a problematic method for many reasons. First, of course, the rulings may represent
an outdated stage in the IRS's evolving policy. Second, the IRS may simply be applying its
policy inconsistently, as the ACT REPORT suggests, since the IRS has determined that they
may have to deal with governance practices ad hoc. ACT REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. Finally,
and most importantly, without looking at favorable rulings as well, it is impossible to have any
clear sense of the universe of fact patterns from which the IRS has drawn its denials. With-
out being able to compare organizations that have been approved, there is no way to know
whether board independence was a determinative factor or not in any case. All we know is
that there have been denials in which the IRS thought it relevant to discuss the board's lack
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A. The IRS is Apparently Requiring Some Organizations to Have Independent
Board Members
A review of the rulings and cases identified by the IRS's critics
suggests that the IRS is-at least sometimes-urging some organizations
to expand their governing boards. For example, in PLR 2008-28-029,
the IRS expressed concern that the organization, whose purpose was to
develop low-income housing, had a board of directors that had financial
interests in the organization's activities. It said, "[wie asked whether you
were willing to expand your board so that it is more representative of the
community that it serves .... You responded that you would add additional
board members with no financial interest in your affairs within the first 12
months of closing your first acquisition."6 Likewise, in PLR 2005-35-029,
a ruling about an organization that intended to run a faith-based addiction
rehabilitation center, the IRS stated, "In Response [number one] of the
above letter, you advise us that your governing board has been expanded
with two new members."6 Presumably, this action was taken in response
to requests by the IRS. In Exploratory Research, Inc. v. Commissioner, the
court notes that the IRS "requested petitioner to alter its board of directors
to include members unrelated to [the founder] 'to insure that . . . [the]
organization will serve public interests.' 6  After the petitioner refused to
alter its board, arguing that the law did not require it, the IRS "renewed his
request that petitioner add members to its board of directors."*6 Similarly,
in Ohio Disability Ass'n. v. Commissioner, the court described a letter from
the IRS to the organization asking "[w]hether petitioner would modify
the board of directors to include unrelated individuals selected from the
community the corporation will serve."'
The rulings do not uniformly provide a legal justification for the IRS's
request that an organization expand its governing board, but the IRS has
provided a legal argument that an independent board is a pre-requisite
for exemption-at least sometimes. For example, in a letter to a religious
organization seeking exemption, the IRS stated its position plainly:
Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) of the Income Tax Regulations states that an
organization which serves private interests rather than public purposes does
not qualify for exempt status. To insure that your organization will serve
public interests changes should be made to the bylaws whereby control is
of independence, and we know what the IRS chose to say about that lack of independence.
65 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-28-029 (Jul. II, 2oo8).
66 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-35-029 (Sept. 2, 2005).
67 Exploratory Research, Inc. v. Comm'r, 95 TC.M. (CCH) 1347, at *2 (2008).
.68 Id.
69 Ohio Disability Ass'n v. Comm'r, 98 TC.M. (CCH) 462, at *2 (zoo9).
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vested in a Board of Directors consisting of a majority of unrelated persons.
Please provide the name, title, address and compensation of each newly
appointed governing body member when responding to this letter.'o
The IRS appears to be saying that it interprets Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)
(1)(ii) of the Treasury Regulations to require that an organization--or at
least this organization-have an independent board to ensure that the
organization serve a public purpose rather than private interests. That is,
the IRS is requiring the organization to have an independent board as a
prophylactic against excessive private benefits.
I argue that the IRS's argument is not plainly without merit. In fact,
if the IRS acts within certain constraints, it may be within its authority to
require certain organizations to have independent boards. The key is to
identify sufficiently robust constraints to ensure that the IRS will only push
for adoption of an independent board in appropriate situations.
B. The Argument that Board Composition is Legally Relevant
In order to understand the IRS's policy regarding board independence,
it is necessary to understand the basic legal argument about the relevance
of an independent board. The existence or not of an independent board is
relevant to an exemption determination because of the requirement under
section 501(c)(3) that an exempt organization be "organized and operated"
for certain purposes" (so-called exempt purposes)." This provision has
been interpreted to mean that an organization is not exempt "if more than
an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt
purpose."" That is, it is not exempt if it either does not primarily serve
any exempt purpose or if it serves a non-exempt purpose in a substantial
way. The fact that an organization must not only advance an exempt
purpose, but cannot advance any other purpose too much is best expressed
in Treasury Regulation §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii):
An organization is [not exempt] unless it serves a public rather than a private
interest. Thus, to meet the requirement of this subdivision, it is necessary
for an organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the
benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his
family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or
indirectly, by such private interests.74
70 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-43-032 (Oct. 24, 2oo8) (quoting correspondence from IRS
to petitioner).
71 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2oo6).
72 See Treas. Reg. § i.5o(c)(3)-I(c)(I) (2009) (defining "exempt purposes").
73 Id
74 Id. § I.5o1(c)(3)-i(d)(i)(ii) (emphasis added).
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Thus, under the Regulations, an organization must establish not only
that it affirmatively is organized and operated for a "public" purpose,
but also that it is not organized or operated substantially for a "private"
purpose, or for the purpose of advancing "private" interests. In reviewing
the organization's structure and operations, the ways in which "private
interests" benefit or are likely to benefit from the organization is expressly
relevant. Specifically, the interests of "the creator or his family" or "persons
controlled" by the creator or his family are relevant.
The Regulations appear to require that the IRS make a difficult, fact-
intensive determination-is the organization formed for a public purpose
or is there a substantial private purpose? The determination is even more
difficult because it presumably requires the IRS to predict future behavior.
The idea that the IRS is making a determination about the purpose of the
organization implies that it is seeing into the organization's (founder's?)
heart to determine what it plans to do in the future.
It is not a wholly unreasonable inference that an organization entirely
controlled by "the creator or his family ... or persons controlled ... by such
private interests" would be more easily used by those persons to advance
their private interests than an organization not controlled by such private
interests. There are numerous cases denying or revoking tax exemption
that have discussed the fact that the board of directors of the organization
entirely consisted of or was largely dominated by a single person or family."
In the recent adverse determination letters cited by critics of the IRS
governance initiative, the IRS has been citing these cases repeatedly. 6
Thus, it is established law that the lack of an independent board may be
relevant to an IRS determination of whether an organization is organized
for a substantial private purpose. 7 Specifically, the dominance of the
board by the organization's creator or his family may be evidence that the
organization was created to advance a private purpose. Or, if the creator
is inclined to use the organization for his private purposes, his dominance
of the organization's governing board may make the advancement of such
private purposes more likely or more easily accomplished.
On the other hand, many organizations engage in transactions with their
founders. These transactions may be the best way for an organization to
advance its charitable purposes (as when founders provide goods, services,
75 See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 E2d I197, 1201 (Ct.
Cl. 1969); New Dynamics Found. v. United States, 7o Fed. Cl. 782, 790-91 (2oo6); Bubbling
Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 TC. 531,534-35 (1980), aff'd, 670 F2d 104
(9th Cir. 1981).
76 For example, Bubbling Well, 74 T.C. at 531, is cited in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200-02-041
(Jan. 15, 2010), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oog-16-035 (Apr. 17, 2009), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-46-
o4o (Nov. 14, 2oo8), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-45-053 (Nov. 7,2oo8), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-
43-032 (Oct. 24, 2oo8), and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-30-028 (July 25, zoo8).
77 Among others, the ACT has recognized that fact: "We certainly appreciate that gover-
nance can bear on the operational test, among other issues." ACT REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
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or capital to organizations at below-market rates). Congress expressly chose
to permit such transactions when it drafted the prohibitions on excess
benefit transactions (for public charities) and self-dealing (for private
foundations), which prohibit certain transactions between organizations and
their founders and permit others." Obviously, the IRS's task-to predict
which organizations will further a substantial private purpose and deny
those organizations exemption-could not swallow up all organizations
who engage in transactions with their founders. The IRS could not impose
a per se rule that all organizations must have an independent board in order
to be exempt under section 501(c)(3).
If itis true that the IRS may not have a perse rule against non-independent
boards nor must it completely turn a blind eye to the composition of an
organization's governing board, what can the IRS do under federal law?
The IRS can do the following: If the IRS concludes that an organization
has been formed for a substantial private purpose because of the likelihood
of substantial financial dealings with the organization's founder, it could
offer to the organization a way to have its exemption approved anyway by
incorporating some independent board members. In other words, the IRS
could offer the organization a means of assuring the IRS that the already
identified substantial private interests will not dominate the organization.
This proposed prophylactic measure could be the expansion of the board
to include a sufficient number of independent directors to mitigate the
founder's dominance. If the organization agrees, then the IRS's fears of
excessive private purpose are allayed.
It appears from the rulings that-at least sometimes-this is in fact
the IRS's position. 9 If the organization should be denied exempt status
because of evidence that it has substantial private purposes, then it is not
improper for the IRS to offer it a means to protect against that improper
private purpose and to condition its tax exempt status on instituting some
effective mechanism. In that sense, the IRS is fully within its authority if
78 See I.R.C. § 4941(d) (2006) (defining what constitutes self-dealing); id § 4958(c)(i)(A)
(explaining excess benefit transactions).
79 For example, in PLR 2008-43-032 (small church), the IRS states, "[clontrol has, and
continues to be, an issue since application was initially filed. Despite repeated requests to
expand control, any efforts made in responding to such requests have been superficial and
ineffectual." I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-43-032 (Oct. 24, zoo8). The same ruling continues:
"your organization is under the control of a single individual, the Pastor and President. This
issue has been raised repeatedly in information requests, to no avail." Id. In PLR 2oo8-28-
029 (affordable housing organization), the IRS asked the organization to expand its board; the
organization stated that it would in the near future, and the ruling stated, "[njo change in the
composition of your board has been made to date." I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-28-o29 (July 1I,
2oo8). In PLR 2005-35-029 (spiritual rehabilitation organization), the organization expanded
its board by two members, apparently in response to the IRS's request, and the IRS issued the
organization an adverse determination ruling anyway. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo5-35-029 (Sept.
2, 2005). Thus, it appears that the IRS is offering to organizations the opportunity to correct
substantial private-purpose problems by expanding their boards.
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it offers an organization that otherwise would fail to qualify as exempt a
prophylactic measure that will save its exemption.s0
It would be improper for the IRS to refuse to accept other effective
prophylactic measures that the organization itself proposes. But it is not
improper to suggest diversifying the board of directors. To the degree
that the IRS is offering charities this option, they are within their proper
authority.
However, if this approach is within the IRS's authority, the question
remains what means the IRS should use to identify those organizations
that pose a sufficient threat of a substantial private purpose that it justifies
denying exemption-absent the prophylactic adoption of an independent
board--on account of that threat. It appears from the recent adverse
determination letters that the IRS considers mere dominance of the board
by non-independent directors an insufficient reason to be concerned about
private benefit. Instead, it appears to consider four factors relevant."
III. EVIDENCE OF THE IRS's APPROACH FROM RECENT ADVERSE RULINGs: A
PROPHYLACTIC APPROACH WHEN RISK OF SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE INTERESTS
SEEMS HIGH
While board composition may be relevant to the IRS's determination
that an organization is formed for a proper purpose, it is also well-accepted
that under federal law there is no per se rule that a board may not be
dominated by (or even consist exclusively of) an organization's creator or
his family. 2 Both the IRS and the critics of the IRS's governance initiatives
have been very clear that no federal law83 requires organizations to have
even one "independent" board member.8 So, how has the IRS been
8o The Fishing Charity, discussed infra at Part III.B, should provide important counter-
examples. In that case, the public purpose of the organization is clear and there is no evidence
of a substantial private purpose. Thus, it would be improper for the IRS to attempt to require
this organization to incorporate independent board members as a prophylactic against private
benefit. The mere opportunity to advance a private benefit that is shared by all organizations
is not sufficient to warrant IRS intervention into board governance matters. Congress has
specifically chosen not to require any independent board members in general.
81 This Article discusses the first three factors in Part III, infra, and the final factor in
Part IV, infra.
82 See, e.g., Ohio Disability Ass'n v Comm'r, 98 TC.M. (CCH) 462, at *8 (2009) ("The
Commissioner has ruled that an organization will not be denied tax-exempt status merely
because the organization is controlled by one individual.").
83 Some states require some number of "independent" board members. See Reiser, sa-
pra note 27, at 798 nn.12-13 (listing statutes requiring some board independence in Maine,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont, and California).
84 See Brody & Tyler, supra note 4, at 577-78; see also Fishman, supra note 6, at 562-63,
570-72. There are certain limited exceptions. For example, under the Pension Protection
Act of 2oo6, Congress mandated that an organization that provides "credit counseling ser-
vices" and is exempt under section 501 of the Code must have a governing body that both
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determining which organizations create enough risk that they have been
formed for a substantial private purpose to warrant a requirement that they
expand their board to include independent directors?
A. Control by Creator or Founder
First, it appears from the adverse determination letters that the IRS
is concerned with domination by the board of.the creator or founder of
the organization, not merely by directors.who could be considered non-
independent. Of the adverse determination letters reviewed, the vast
majority involved organizations in which the governing board was composed
exclusively of the founders or creators of the organization." No adverse
determination letters involved control of the board by mere employees or
other "non-independent" directors otherwise unconnected to the creation
of the organization. 16
To understand the implications of this limitation, it is important to
review the multiplicity of the operative definitions of an "independent"
board member. For the purposes of this Article, an "independent"
director is defined as anyone who has no financial interest in the charitable
organization." But it was pointed out that the definition that the IRS has
adopted for the purposes of its Form 990 was significantly narrower." In
the for-profit sector, definitions of "independent" directors have commonly
emphasized that these directors are not employees of the organization.8 9
It appears that the IRS's definition for the purposes of its determinations
function is narrower still. The IRS is really concerned with organizations
that are completely dominated by their founders or creators. This interest
"is controlled by persons who represent the broad interests of the public," and which is not
dominated by persons "who will benefit financially, directly or indirectly, from the organiza-
tion's activities." Pension Protection Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. io9-280, § 1220, 120 Stat. 780,
lo86 (2oo6) (codified at 1.R.C. § S0(q)(i)(D)).
85 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-020-41 (Jan. 15, 2010); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-
30-028 (Jul. 25, zoo8); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-24-025 (June 13, 2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2007-33-027 (Aug. 17, 2007); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2007-37-044 (Sept. 14, 2007); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 2007-36-037 (Sept. 7, 2007); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-35-029 (Sept. 2, 2005); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-14-021 (Apr. 8, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-10-031 (Mar. II, 2005);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-43-032 (Oct. 24, 2oo8); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-28-029 (July II,
2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-46-o4o (Nov. 14, 2oo8); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-16-035 (Apr.
17, 2009); see also Ohio Disability Ass'n v. Comm'r, 98 TC.M. (CCH) 462 (2oog); Exploratory
Research, Inc. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1347 (2oo8)).
86 In other words, in its determinations rulings, the IRS is not concerned with the sepa-
ration of oversight (in a board) and management (in employees). See Brody, supra note 58, at
669-70.
87 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo, 'Independence' and the 'EO'
Governing Board: A General Counsel's Guide, 41 EXEMPr ORG. TAx REV. 379, 38o-8 1 (2003).
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makes sense, given the explicit focus on "the creator or his family" in the
Regulations.' They are not concerned with organizations that merely have
employees or other professionals as directors.
B. Substantial Ongoing Financial Transactions
Between Founder and Organization
The adverse determination letters do not show an interest by the IRS
in all organizations in which the governing board is dominated by the
founders or creators, however. Rather, the letters generally concern only
organizations in which the founders/directors intend to engage in substantial
ongoing financial transactions with the organization. It makes perfect sense
that the IRS would not be overly concerned about organizations in which
a founder who dominated the governing board has no financial dealings
with the organization since a director who does not engage in financial
transactions with an organization is "independent" under all the operative
definitions. The quintessential trait of a "non-independent" director is
that she engages in financial transactions with, or has a financial interest in,
the organization.
To illustrate this issue, imagine a hypothetical organization called the
"Fishing Charity." The founderofthe Fishing Charity has an idiosyncratic-
perhaps even misguided-vision of the public good. He has taken the old
adage-teach a man to fish, and you feed him for life-and has decided that the
best way to eradicate poverty is to give the poor fishing rods. The founder
plans to distribute fishing rods in poor neighborhoods free of charge and
hold free basic classes teaching fishing techniques. He has never found
anyone other than himself who believes that literally teaching the poor to
fish will eradicate poverty, and so he has trouble finding people to serve
on his board, but his vision is unshaken. He chooses to create a charitable
organization entirely controlled by him. Perhaps he is required under state
law to have more than one director," so he persuades his wife, or even his
wife and son, to join him on the board, which they do out of love for him.
He and his other family members do not gain anything material from the
distribution of fishing rods. He is not in the business of selling them or
of selling anything else connected with fishing. He holds no copyright
in his fishing training materials and does not have any commercial tie to
the fishing classes his organization provides. Under the Fishing Charity's
organizational documents, he and his family are prohibited outright from
engaging in any financial transactions with the Charity, and the evidence
suggests that they never have done so.
90 See Treas. Reg. § I.5o1(c)(3)-r(d)(i)(ii), discussed supra at notes 73-74.
91 See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 8.03(a) (2008).
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The Fishing Charity should easily satisfy the "organizational" and the
"operational" tests. It has a substantial exempt or public purpose: the
eradication of poverty. It also does not have any substantial private purpose,
or at least none has been identified. While the Regulations caution against
organizations created to advance the "private interests" of "the creator or his
family," it is clear that an idiosyncratic vision of how to advance the public
good is not a "private interest." Rather, "private interests" of concern are
likely to be financial." Thus, under the facts provided, it seems clear that
the Fishing Charity should be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code.93
But now imagine an organization in which the governing board was
financially interested in the organization and therefore not "independent."
For example, imagine a permutation of the Fishing Charity in which the
founder was in the fishing rod fabrication business. For a hundred years, his
family has owned a company that makes and sells fishing rods and tackle.
His plan is for his Charity to seek contributions from the general public,
and then use the money to purchase fishing equipment at market price (or
slightly discounted price) from his company, which the Charity would then
provide free of charge to the poor. Let's call this organization the Corporate
Fishing Charity because it has a tie-in to his family business. Because
the organization plans to purchase fishing equipment from the founder's
business, he is an "interested" director under our broad definition.
It seems clear that the IRS's concern-whether the organization is truly
formed for a public purpose or instead formed for the benefit of private
interests-is more clearly implicated in the case of the Corporate Fishing
Charity than in the Fishing Charity. The plan to engage regularly in
transactions with a company owned by board members intuitively seems
to create a risk of advancing private interests in a way that mere control
by founders does not. But it is not immediately clear whether or when-
if ever-this apparent risk should translate into a denial of exemption or
other action by the IRS.
92 There are cases in which courts have held that a substantial private interest may be
non-financial and still disqualify the organization for exemption. See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad.
v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1072 (1989) (organization training political operatives provides a
substantial private benefit to the Republican Party); see also Founding Church of Scientology
v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1201 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (organization provides both financial and
other benefits to its founder). But I know of no case that has held that a merely personal or
idiosyncratic (or misguided) vision of the means to attain a clearly public purpose constitutes
a "private interest."
93 Of course, in order to qualify as exempt under section 501(c)(3), the Charity must also
meet the other requirements of that section. For example, it must ensure that "no substantial
part of [its] activities [consist of| carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation" and that it "does not participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2oo6).
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It is worth pointing out that there are two potential concerns of the
IRS when reviewing an exemption application from an organization
like the Corporate Fishing Charity. First, it may be concerned that the
organization will engage in excess benefit transactions.94 Since we know
that the organization is going to buy fishing rods to supply to the poor and
the founder of the Charity is in the business of selling fishing rods, we
may be concerned that he will cause the charity to purchase fishing rods
at inflated prices, providing him with a direct financial benefit. This may
happen even if the fishing rods are sold at their list price, if, for example,
the Charity purchases fishing rods at full price that would otherwise have
to be sold at sale or discounted prices. Presumably, demand for a specific
type of fishing rod will not perfectly match supply all the time, and it may
be in a business's commercial interest to have a ready market for its over-
produced models. But the concern here is not just that the organization
will purchase products from the founder's company. The concern here
is that the organization will pay too much for the fishing equipment and
thereby waste the Charity's assets.
Second, the IRS may be concerned not (only) with excess benefit
transactions but with the fact that the organization is serving a substantial
private interest, even if all of the transactions are completely reasonable. Imagine
that the Corporate Fishing Charity acquires all of its rods from the founder's
company at the true fair market value, not just the "list price." Or, perhaps
it even acquires them at below the true fair market value. So long as the
company provides them at more than cost, one could argue that there is a
commercial benefit in that a profit is made on the sale of each rod, and that
commercial benefit may be the real motivation for creating the Charity.
Even if the company provides the fishing rods at below cost, there may be
a commercial benefit. For example, the company may be creating a new
market for the future purchase of more expensive rods by providing them
for free to people previously uninterested in fishing. Companies often give
products away hoping to build interest in their products in this way. Or,
they may be providing themselves with good publicity, building goodwill,
or free advertising for their products. Thus, the private interest may
theoretically dominate even if no excess benefit transactions will occur.9s
This second potential concern of the IRS is more controversial.
As discussed above, dominance of an organization by the creator(s) or
founder(s) of an organization are of potential concern to the IRS, but only if
there is some significant opportunity for them to advance private financial
interests. Thus, the broad definition of independence-not having any
financial interest in the organization-is relevant to IRS determinations
since dominance by independent directors raises few questions regarding
94 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(I) (West Supp. 2010).
95 See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at lo68-69, 1072.
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the public purpose of the organization, even if the organization is dominated
by its creator(s) or founder(s). On the other hand, when an organization is
dominated by founders who are simultaneously "non-independent" (in the
sense that they engage in financial transactions with the organization), the
IRS may have some cause for concern.
The only example of an adverse determination issued to an organization
that was dominated by a founder with no financial interest in the
organization is PLR 2007-37-044.6 That ruling dealt with an organization
created by a man primarily to distribute his own sperm free of charge to
women seeking to use it. to become impregnated. The IRS determined
that eighty-eight percent of the sperm had been donated by the founder,
and that the remaining twelve percent was donated by only two other
donors.17 Furthermore, the organization screened and selected recipients
of the donated sperm but did not apparently make the case that it did so
on any charitable criteria.98 In addition, the ruling notes that all of the
organization's funding came from donations by the founder." Finally,
the organization's governing body consisted solely of the founder and his
father, who were both the only "trustees" and the only officers.10 The IRS
held that the organization did not meet the requirements for an exempt
organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Code."'
It is worth noting that the IRS ' did not identify any financial
transactions between the organization and its founder/directors (except
cash contributions). There was no evidence that the directors intended
to compensate themselves either as employees, private contractors, or
directors. Nor did the ruling mention any evidence that the creators of
the organization planned to engage in any other financial transactions
with the organization. In other words, the directors of the organization
would qualify as "independent" under either the Form 990 definition or
our broader definition. Nonetheless, the IRS expressly noted the small
number of directors and their relationship to each other, to the sperm
donors, and to the financial donors several times. The IRS clearly noted
that the dominance of the board by the founder and his father were material
facts in the denial of exemption for the organization.
96 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo7-37-o44 (Sept. 14, 2007); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-
36-037 (Sept. 7, 2007) (operating under the exact same facts). These rulings were affirmed in
Free Fertility Found. v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 2, at *3-4 (20oo), although the court did not mention
the governance issues discussed herein.
97 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo7-37-044 (Sept. 14, 2007).
98 Id.
99 Id.
1oo Id.
ioi Id.
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The ruling separated its "rationale" into two subheadings: "Serving a
Public Interest" and "Private Benefit.""oz It held that providing sperm for
free is not inherently a public purpose and distinguished the sperm donation
activities from a 1966 revenue ruling holding that blood donation services
were a proper public purpose. 0 3 It listed three facts that distinguished
the sperm donation activities from the blood donation ruling: (1) the
composition of the respective organizations' boards;" (2) the number of
donors of sperm (three) as opposed to the number of donors of
blood (presumably many);' and (3) the fact that the women who received
the sperm for free were not "needy" in any economic sense, while some
of the women who received blood were.10 6 Without explaining which
distinguishing characteristics were material, the IRS argued that the sperm
donation organization did not advance a proper "public" purpose. 07
The second subheading, "Private Benefit," included only one claim
supporting the argument that the organization was created for a substantial
private purpose. It relied entirely on the domination of the board by "your
founder, your sole financial donor, your principal sperm donor, one of two
related trustees and one of two related officers." 0 In the next section, the
ruling concluded that the organization is not exempt because it advances a
private interest.'"
This ruling seems at first reading to support the claim that the IRS
will deny tax-exempt status to organizations dominated by the founder
even if there is no evidence that the founder intends to benefit financially
from the organization. It appears more likely, however, that despite the
explanation in the ruling, the IRS is not taking the position that the mere
dominance of the organization by its founder disqualifies the organization
for exemption. Rather, it is probable that the fact that the organization was
(arguably) created for a substantial private purpose, even if not a financial
IO2 Id.
So3 Id.
1o4 Id. The IRS distinguished between the sperm donation organization at issue and a
blood donation organization held to be exempt by commenting that "your Board of Directors
consists of only two individuals,... who are father and son, respectively." Id. The IRS further
commented that "[i]t is ... significant that [a single person] is your founder, your sole financial
donor, and your principal sperm donor." Id.
105 Id.
io6 Id. If this is indeed the IRS's argument, it is not completely clear that it is right as a
matter of law. Providing sperm to women who need it to have a baby does seem to further the
recognized charitable goal of "advancing health" and should be a sufficient public purpose.
Similarly, if the sperm is provided for free to all recipients, it is by definition provided for free
to those who are economically needy. There is no requirement that a product necessary for
health be provided for a charge to those who can afford it.
107 Id.
io8 Id.
i09 Id.
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one, is what disqualified the organization for exemption. It would be easy
enough to fill in an explanation for why a sperm-donation organization
like the one described was created to advance the private purposes of its
founder. It is generally accepted that a person has a "private" interest in
his offspring, and even in producing offspring.' It is plausible that the
organization was formed to advance the private interest of increasing the
quantity (or quality) of the donor's offspring who carry his genetic material.
If that is the real purpose of the organization, then the IRS is well within
the current law to deny such an organization exempt status-even though
the founder/controlling director was "independent" in the sense of free
from any financial interest in the organization-notwithstanding the fact
that it did not plainly explain the likely private purpose in the ruling. But
this private purpose-disseminating genetic material-is unusual. Most
often the private interest that causes concern is a financial interest, and
thus, most often the IRS will be interested only in domination by founders
with a financial interest in the organization.
Generally, the organizations that were denied exemption intended
to engage in significant ongoing financial transactions with their
founders."' For example, PLR 2009-16-035 involved an organization
formed by a group of cousins to promote the legacy of a historical person
who was their aunt."' The organization described potential activities, like
constructing and operating a museum and giving scholarships, which would
constitute a public purpose if performed."' But the IRS expressed concern
that the primary activity of the organization would be to operate a "family
website" that would sell memorabilia related to the aunt, and which was
operated as a for-profit LLC."4 There is no information about whether the
for-profit LLC was wholly owned by the organization, or whether it was
a joint-venture with other private owners. In addition, the organization
reported that a significant activity would be for the organization to
"purchase, from members of the organization [all of whom were cousins],
at fair market value, items such as 'designs, artwork, logos, poetry, [and]
sheet music."'
5
If the organization actually did the things it proposed to do to promote
the legacy of the founders' aunt, those things would likely be evidence
of a proper exempt purpose. But the operation of the website created a
i io See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE II (3oth Anniversary ed. 2oo6) argu-
ing, generally, that organisms act to advance the interests of their genes, not themselves per-
sonally, and therefore are "selfish" when they act to advance the interests of their offspring,
even to their own personal detriment).
iii See supra note 85.
112 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. zoo9-16-o35 (Apr. 17, 2009).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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financial interest in the directors of the organization. Here, the IRS could
be concerned that the organization would pay the cousins too much for
their artwork and poetry. Overpaying insiders-engaging in excess benefit
transactions-would clearly constitute a "private purpose" substantial
enough to negate the public purposes of the organization. The problem,
from the government's point of view, is whether the evidence supports an
inference that the organization is likely to overpay in the transactions it will
conduct.
In addition, there is an argument that the organization was created
to advance a private interest even if the artists and poets were paid only
fair market value for their works. The argument would be that if the
true dominant purpose (or a true substantial purpose) of the organization
is to provide a market for the artistic output of the founder/directors or
their relatives, then this private purpose negates the organization's public
purpose even if the transactions are all at fair market value.
In either case, the IRS may pay special attention to potential insider
transactions and the safeguards that the organization takes to prevent them
from being abused. In fact, the majority of the ruling was devoted to a
discussion of the dominance of the board by the founder."' The IRS found
substantial proposed financial transactions between the directors and the
organization."' The organization failed to provide information about how
it would protect against domination of these financial purposes, and how
it would protect against excess benefit transactions when conducting
business with board members." 8
Finally, one ruling that should not be controversial is PLR 2008-45-053."'
In that case, an organization seeking to "promote and finance research,
prototype design and commercialization of Pollution Free Energy" was
created as a "stock corporation," with the founders individually owning the
stock.2 0 Here, the ruling discussed the commerciality of the organization
as well as the lack of an independent board."' The ruling should have
been a single sentence denying exemption because the organization was
neither organized as a nonprofit organization nor as a business corporation
prohibited from paying dividends to its owners and whose assets are
i16 Id. In this example, it should be pointed out that the evidence of regular financial
transactions between the organization and its board members would disqualify those board
members for "independent" status under the broad definition; but because none of the board
members were likely to be paid as employees or independent contractors, they probably
would qualify as "independent" under the definition provided in FORM 990. See discussion
supra Part I.B.
I17 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-16-035 (Apr. 17, 2009).
II8 Id.
I 19 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 20o8-45-053 (Nov. 7, 2oo8).
i2o Id.
121 Id.
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distributed to charity upon dissolution. Organizing a charity as a business
corporation with private shareholders under state law is generally a per
se violation of the prohibition on private inurement.' 2 Nonetheless, in
addition to its discussion of private inurement arising out of potential
dividends, the IRS discussed the fact that the board is controlled by
three persons, and therefore could be operated for their private benefit.'23
This organization was dominated by its founders, and its founders were
empowered to have an ongoing financial relationship with the organization
since they could presumably receive dividends or distributed profits from
it. It obviously fit the profile for an organization that would arouse the
IRS's concern.
In each of the cases discussed, the IRS identified organizations in
which the governing board was dominated by the organization's founders
and in which those founders intended to engage in ongoing financial
transactions with the organization. In these situations, the IRS may
require some assurance that the organizations will not provide excessive
private benefits to their founders. It can accept an independent board-
or some independent board members-as a sufficient form of assurance.
If the organization refuses to take any prophylactic measures, the IRS is
presumably within its authority to deny the organization tax exemption.
C. IRS "Hands-Off' Policy Toward Private Foundations
The third factor that the IRS appears to be applying to determine
whether an organization should be required to have an independent board
is whether the organization is a "public charity" or a "private foundation."
The IRS has expressed a clear policy of refraining from encouraging or
requiring so-called private foundations to have independent governing
boards.
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are classified under section 509 of the
Code as either private foundations or not (hereinafter, "public charities").
While private foundations are treated differently from public charities
in several ways, one notable difference is how transactions between the
organization and its directors or other insiders are regulated. Public charities
are subject to a penalty regime that applies to transactions between the
organization and its directors (and certain other insiders), but this regime
generally permits transactions unless they are unfair to the organization.'24
Transactions between private foundations and certain insiders are subject
122 See Treas. Reg. § I.5 01(c)(3)-I(b)(4) (2oo8) ("[Ain organization does not meet the
organizational test if its articles or the law of the State in which it was created provide that its
assets would, upon dissolution, be distributed to its members or shareholders.").
123 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-45-053 (Nov. 7, 2oo8).
124 See I.R.C. § 4958 (West Supp. 200).
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to a more restrictive penalty regime."' This regime completely prohibits
certain insider transactions and requires additional reporting of other
transactions.z 6
Under federal law, private foundation status can be avoided in several
ways. Section 509 of the Code provides that a 501(c)(3) organization is a
private foundation unless it meets one of the statutory exceptions: (1) that
the organization is a church, (2) that the organization is a school, (3) that the
organization is a hospital, (4) that the organization is a governmental unit,
(5) that the organization is a so-called supporting organization, or (6) that
the organization meets one of several "public support" tests.'27
The most basic way to avoid being classified as a private foundation is to
meet one of the public support tests. In general, to qualify for public charity
status under the public support tests, an organization needs to receive a
significant portion of its financial support from donations from multiple
donors, the government, or proceeds from the operation of its charitable
activities.'" In other words, it needs to have a relatively broad base of donors
or purchasers of services. This broad base of donors constitutes a class of
quintessential independent stakeholders. The existence of these donors/
stakeholders is believed to provide a check on the organization's ability
to advance merely private interests.'29 The theory is that the organization
could not raise money from multiple independent donors unless it served a
public interest and did not serve a substantial private interest.
To illustrate the distinction between private foundations and public
charities, imagine the Fishing Charity described previously.'30 Recall that
we initially created the hypothetical on the assumption that the idea of a
charity to distribute fishing equipment to the poor was so idiosyncratic that
its founder could not find any volunteers to serve on the Charity's board
of directors.'' If it also could not find a sufficient number of unrelated
125 See id. H 4940-4945.
126 See id. § 4941.
127 See I.R.C. § 509 (West Supp. 2oo6).
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private Foundation Excise Tax on Failure to
Distribute Income Generally Apply to "Private Foundation Substitutes"? Evaluating the Taxation of
Various Models of Charitable Entities, 44 NEw ENG. L. REV. 493,511-12 (20 1 o) (The assumptions
that plausibly underlie the minimal regulation of public charities include "that the members
of the governing board can be trusted to exercise their fiduciary duties in such a way that fur-
ther regulation ... through tax law is unnecessary.... The most plausible basis for the assump-
tion is the predicate assumption that the charity's reliance on support from the general public
obviates the need for the tax system to restrict or otherwise regulate distributions beyond the
most basic requirements for tax exemption.... The premise also implies that the entity's reli-
ance on support from the general public obviates the need for the tax system to regulate the
composition of the [charity's] governing board."); see also JoHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL,
THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 163-64 (1995) (discussing the logic in more detail).
130 See supra Part III.B.
131 See supra Part III.B.
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donors to support the activities of the organization with contributions, it
would likely fail the various public support tests"2 and would therefore
be classified as a private foundation rather than a public charity."' In that
case, we could call the organization the Fishing Foundation instead of
the Fishing Charity. Likewise, if the so-called Corporate Fishing Charity
(which used donated funds to purchase fishing equipment from the
founder's company) could not find sufficient unrelated donors, it too would
be classified as a private foundation, and so we would call it the Corporate
Fishing Foundation. On the other hand, if either of these organizations
could convince other unrelated persons to donate a substantial portion of
the funds necessary to operate the organization, it would be classified as a
public charity.
Multiple Donors Founder is Only Donor
Financial
Transactions
Th Fon Fishing Charity Fishing Foundation
with Founder
Prohibited
Financial Corporate Fishing Corporate Fishing
Transactions with I
Foude OcurCharity FoundationFounder Occur
In its determinations training materials, the IRS expressly recognized
that private foundations often have governing boards dominated by their
founder or the founder's family. '" According to the IRS, the existence of
stricter rules against self-dealing means that "the composition of a private
foundation governing board is not a concern during the determinations
process."s31
132 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing that companies that fail to
meet the various "public support tests" will be deemed private foundations under section
509 of the Code).
133 The Fishing Charity could also avoid private foundation status if it were a school,
church, a hospital, a governmental unit, or a supporting organization, but we are assuming it
would not meet the criteria of any of those types of organizations.
134 See Determinations Outline supra note 40, at 24 ("Due to its nature, it is typical for a
private foundation to have a related board.... Due to [the existence of more stringent rules on
self-dealing by foundations, among others] the composition of a private foundation governing
board is not a concern during the determination process.").
135 Id.; see INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 8, at 75 (explaining that private foundation
20IO-20II11 761
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The IRS explains its position on private foundations as follows:
The federal law governing the operations of private foundations is
a composite of rules pertaining to self-dealing, mandatory payout
requirements, business holdings, investment practices, various types of
expenditures, and more. Due to these rules, the composition of a private
foundation governing board is not a concern during the determination
process. "
In other words, private foundations by their very nature lack independent
stakeholders. Because of their lack of independent stakeholders, they also
present a natural opportunity for excessive private benefits. Nevertheless,
Congress has made a decision to permit them to be tax-exempt. Special
statutory requirements have been used, instead, to control foundations
more closely and prevent them from being used too extensively for private
ends.
Thus, according to the IRS determinations training materials at least,
the fact that the board of the Corporate Fishing Foundation, for example,
is completely dominated by its founder should not be an impediment
to its tax-exempt status, and determinations agents should not flag that
dominance as a problem or urge the Foundation to add independent
members to its governing board.
There's a certain irony to this, of course. We discussed above that the
IRS may well be concerned about the board of the Corporate Fishing
Foundation: it provides an opportunity for the founders who completely
control the board to enrich themselves. But, according to the IRS
determinations materials, the IRS should not be concerned about a private
foundation that has a "related" board. The presumption is that the stricter
self-dealing rules for private foundations should deal with the situation
sufficiently. In the case of the Corporate Fishing Foundation-at least as
we've described the hypothetical facts-this presumption appears to be
accurate. Under section 4941(d)(1)(c) of the Code, disqualified persons
(including "substantial contributors") are prohibited from providing
goods and services to a private foundation for a charge, even if that charge
is commercially reasonable.' In other words, the Code would prevent
the founder of the Corporate Fishing Foundation from selling fishing
equipment to the Foundation even at reasonable prices. Thus, the excise tax
regime that applies to private foundations prohibits the type of transaction
rules against self-dealing do not apply to public charities, and so private foundations should be
permitted to have non-independent boards, while public charities should be required to have
at least one-third of their boards be independent).
136 Determinations Outline, supra note 40, at 24.
137 See I.R.C. § 49 4 1(d)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2010) If the goods were provided "without
charge" the transaction would be permitted, but not if any charge is made, even if it is a below
market charge.
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described. The IRS's claim that board independence is not required in the
case of a private foundation because of the stricter excise tax that applies to
foundations seems to be borne out in this case.' If the Corporate Fishing
Foundation, in effect, is prohibited outright from operating as described,
then there is presumably no need for such an organization to have an
independent board.
However, changing the facts only slightly significantly undermines
the argument that the private foundation excise tax regime is adequate to
protect against excess private benefit by the founders of the organization.
Imagine that instead of purchasing fishing equipment from the founder's
company, the Corporate Fishing Foundation hired the founder as an
advisor--on fishing, for example, or the benefits of fishing for the poor-
paying him substantial compensation in that role. Nothing in the law would
prevent the organization from paying the founder reasonable compensation
whether the organization was a private foundation or a public charity.'
Thus, in the case of compensation, an independent board may be as
necessary for a private foundation as for a public charity.
The adverse determination letters tell a somewhat mixed story. On
the one hand, there are several adverse determination letters in which the
IRS has focused on board independence issues and denied tax exempt
status to organizations that apparently should have been classified as
private foundations.'* But these adverse determination letters by no
means suggest that the IRS is predominantly disregarding its own policy
of ignoring board independence issues in private foundations. None of
them involve normal private foundations in which a family creates a charity
138 If the facts were slightly different, however, and instead of buying fishing equipment
from the founder's company, the Corporate Fishing Foundation paid the founder a salary
for providing expert consulting services about the link between fishing and prosperity, the
self-dealing rules under section 4941 of the Code would permit the transaction so long as the
services provided were "reasonable and necessary to carrying out the exempt purpose of the
private foundation" and "the compensation ... [was] not excessive." § 49 4 1(d)(2)(E).
139 See id.
14o For example, the sperm donor organization described in PLR z007-37-o44 should
have been classified as a private foundation since it received all its financial support from one
source. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-37-044 (Sept. 14, 2007). The "churches" in PLR 2oo8-
43-032 and PLR 2008-30-028 should have been classified as private foundations if they failed
to meet the criteria for church status. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-43-032 (Oct. 24, 2oo8);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-30-028 (July 25, 2oo8). The most poignant example is the Ohio Dis-
ability Association, which apparently responded to a request from the IRS to modify its "board
of directors to include unrelated individuals selected from the community the corporation will
serve" by replying that it would not do so, and "providling] an amended application designat-
ing [the organization] as a nonoperating private foundation." Ohio Disability Ass'n v. Comm'r,
98 T.C.M. (CCH) 462, at *2 (2009). In other words, the organization asked to be classified as
a private foundation, presumably to avoid the IRS's requirement that it expand its board to
include independent members. The court's opinion does not include any information about
whether the IRS responded to the request, but it upheld the IRS's adverse determination.
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that will receive family contributions and distribute them to charitable
beneficiaries over time.
The adverse determination letters on the whole suggest that the IRS is
indeed leaving private foundations alone. In general, it appears that they are
not encouraging or requiring private foundations to have any independent
board members. There is not one adverse determination letter in which the
IRS recognized that the organization under scrutiny should be classified as
a private foundation but denied it exempt status on account of having no
independent board members.
The discussion above has suggested that the rulings can tell us a few
things about the IRS's view of the relationship between the domination
of boards by "inside directors" and exemption. First, no organization
was denied exemption merely because it included paid employees on its
board of directors, or even because its board was dominated or controlled
by employees. 14 1 That is, the IRS is not attempting to implement a rule
that exempt organizations must have "independent" boards of directors,
in the sense that term is given in Form 990 and in most of the discussion
of board independence in the for-profit contextl 42-directors who are not
part of the professional management of the company. The IRS appears
to be concerned only with the domination of the governing board by
the organization's founders or creators. Second, the IRS is suspicious of
organizations with boards of directors entirely dominated by their founders,
but only when those founders have a strong private interest that might be
advanced by the organization. That private interest may be non-financial,
but that is unusual-the only case in the rulings is the sperm donation
organization in which the private interest was arguably the propagation of
a single man's genetic material.' 3 More common are situations in which
the organization is premised on ongoing financial relationships with the
founder(s)/controlling director(s) of the organization. In these cases, the
IRS has held (at least at times) that these private purposes are substantial
enough to call into question whether they are the real purposes of the
organization, thus negating the purported public purpose and properly
calling the organization's tax exempt status into question under Treasury
Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii). Third, in general, the IRS has been taking
a "hands-off' approach to private foundations. While there are a few
141 It is worth reiterating that our method-reviewing adverse determination letters-
means that we have no information about whether and how often the IRS "persuaded" orga-
nizations to expand their boards of directors in situations in which a favorable determination
was eventually obtained. Thus, it is possible that the IRS has been regularly (or occasion-
ally) urging organizations with "insider" boards to expand their boards even in the absence of
substantial private purpose problems. We just do not see the evidence of that in the adverse
determination rulings we have reviewed.
142 See, e.g., Reiser, supra note 27.
143 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-36-037 (Sept. 7, 2007).
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possible exceptions to the rule, the IRS's approach has generally been to
permit private foundations to have boards of directors that are entirely
dominated by the founders and that intend to continue to engage in
financial transactions with the boards, so long as those financial transactions
are permitted under the self-dealing rules that apply to private foundations.
These three restrictions significantly narrow the field of organizations
that are subject to the IRS's rule about independent directors. But, the
adverse determination letters suggest that another factor may also be
important. The IRS appears to be targeting only organizations that meet
the three criteria described above and that do not have any meaningful
"independent stakeholders."
IV. LACK OF INDEPENDENT STAKEHOLDERS
While the adverse rulings discussed herein suggest that the IRS does
not require charities to have an independent board unless they meet the
three criteria described above, it is not clear that these three criteria are
robust enough to provide an effective check on IRS discretion in this area.
Once the IRS has identified organizations that (i) have governing boards
dominated by their founders, (ii) intend to engage in ongoing financial
transactions with those founders, and (iii) are not private foundations, how
does it identify those in which the risk of substantial private purpose is
so high that exemption should be denied unless the organization adopts
procedural safeguards, of which an "independent" board of directors may
be the most obvious?
While the IRS rulings do not provide a completely satisfactory answer
to this question, they do suggest another factor that appears to be extremely
important to the IRS in identifying those organizations in which the risk
of substantial private purpose is highest. Namely, each organization
discussed in the adverse rulings had no identifiable independent stakeholders
that were in a position to monitor the activities of the organization and
influence its public purpose. None of the rulings expressly identify this
characteristic as important, but it appears that it may be important to the
IRS's evaluation of whether it should press the organization to have an
independent board. Thus, an evaluation of independent stakeholders
may already be providing a check on the IRS's discretion in this area; but
it could serve as a more effective check if the IRS explicitly stated that
independent boards (or other checks on the risk of dominance by private
interests) are only necessary when an organization lacks any meaningful
independent stakeholders.
First, an explanation: I use the term "independent stakeholders"
as a way of identifying people who have an interest in an organization's
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activities other than the organization itself or the government.'" Possible
independent stakeholders include donors, members, beneficiaries,
volunteers, purchasers of goods or services, and others. In an unpublished
work-in-progress, I explore the importance of independent stakeholders to
the government's evaluation of whether an organization is worthy of tax-
exempt status; or more specifically, whether it should qualify to receive
tax-deductible contributions.145 That piece explores the so-called agency-
cost literature about nonprofit organizations.146 It argues that one of the
purposes of the federal law of charities is to enable the federal government
to minimize its own "agency costs" by identifying meaningful independent
stakeholders who can help monitor charitable organizations, in effect, on
the government's behalf.'47 The key for the government in identifying
meaningful independent stakeholders is identifying those persons
whose interest in the charity are the most aligned with the government's
interest. The simplest (although obviously imperfect) way to identify
aligned interests is to exclude persons who have a financial interest in the
charity.'48 The government acts rationally if it only permits tax-deductible
contributions to go to organizations that have meaningful independent
stakeholders. Thus, to the degree they exert influence over an organization,
independent stakeholders advance the government's interests when they
advance their own interests. Viewed in this way, "independent" board
members are just one category of potential independent stakeholders.
A. Relevance of Independent Stakeholders Under Federal Law
Despite the fact that it would be rational for the government to
restrict tax-deductible contributions to only those organizations that have
independent stakeholders, that is not the way federal law generally works.
The qualifications for exemption under federal law do not require an
organization to have any identifiable independent stakeholders. Although
independent stakeholders are not generally required as a precondition of
exemption, the concept of independent stakeholders is deeply embedded
in federal law, specifically in the distinction between private foundations
and public charities.
144 A more systematic analysis of the relationship between third-party stakeholders
and charitable organizations under federal law is attempted in Benjamin M. Leff, The Case
Against For-Profit Charity: An Agency Cost Analysis (July 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript)
(preliminary draft on file with the author).
145 Id.
146 See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REv 497,
6oo (981); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of NonprofitEnterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 873 (1980).
147 Leff, supra note 144.
148 See I.R.C. § 509(a) (West Supp. zoio).
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Thus, the existence of independent stakeholders, especially donors,
is relevant to a determination of whether an organization is a private
foundation or a public charity under federal law. But it is not generally
relevant to the initial determination of whether an organization is tax-exempt.149
How, then, is the IRS using the existence of independent stakeholders in
its analysis of an organization's initial qualifications for exempt status?
B. IRS Treatment of Organizations Without Meaningful Independent Stakeholders
The rulings seem to suggest that the IRS is taking an acute interest
in the determinations phase in the existence of independent stakeholders
when organizations are dominated by their founders and when those
founders have the potential to profit financially from the operation of the
organization. The absence of meaningful independent stakeholders-
especially donors-appears to be significant to the IRS's evaluation of
whether an organization qualifies for exemption or not. Specifically, none
of the adverse rulings appear to describe organizations that have multiple
donors of money, such that the organization would avoid private foundation
status on account of voluntary contributions alone. In general, then, it
appears that organizations that successfully raise money from multiple
donors are not denied exemption on account of being dominated by
founders or insiders.c 0 This observation is. extremely important. If the
field of organization subject to the IRS's "independent-board" requirement
excludes both organizations that are private foundations and organizations
that avoid private foundation status because of multiple donors, then it is a
much narrower category than it might initially appear to be.
The rulings not only exclude organizations with multiple independent
donors, they also discuss at length the importance of the absent independent
stakeholders, even when that factor should not technically be relevant
to an initial determination of tax-exempt status. For example, the lack
of independent stakeholders was material to the IRS's determination in
149 In general, the determination of whether the organization is a private foundation
or a public charity has nothing to do with the composition of its governing board. There is
one limited exception to this rule. Under the so-called facts and circumstances test, which
is only applied if an organization cannot meet the other public support tests, one relevant
fact is whether the organization has a "representative governing body" or not. Treas. Reg. §
1.17oA-9(e)(3)(v) (2oo8). If the organization's governing body is composed of various types
of persons, including "public officials[;] ... persons having special knowledge or expertise in
the particular field or discipline in which the organization is operating; ... clergymen, educa-
tors, civic leaders, [and others]" then that weighs in favor of granting the organization public
charity status. Id.
150 It is worth reiterating here the weaknesses in our method and the impossibility of
making any confident claims about the IRS's intentions from adverse determination letters
alone. See supra note 64.
201O-20II1 767
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
PLR 2007-37-044, the sperm donation case discussed above."s' There, the
IRS pointed out that all of the organization's funds were provided by a
single donor.' Therefore, the organization had no independent donors
of funds to serve as independent stakeholders. While the recipients of
the sperm could conceivably count as independent stakeholders, they are
unlikely to be in a position to monitor the organization very effectively or
cause change. After all, their only connection to the organization may be
receiving something of value from it for free. Thus, their interest in the
proper functioning of the organization may be narrow.
The IRS was also very interested in the existence of independent
stakeholders in several of the rulings that involved organizations that
purported to be "churches." An organization is tax exempt under section
501(c)(3) if it advances religious purposes. '5 If it is a "church" (really a
house of worship in any faith), it can avoid private foundation status on that
account.15 4 Thus, an exempt religious organization avoids private foundation
status by being a church, but whether it is a church or not should not be
relevant to whether it qualifies as tax-exempt in the first place.
What constitutes a church is somewhat contested, but it is clear that one
foundational attribute of a church is that it has members who meet together
regularly to worship-a congregation. 5 A church whose congregation
consists solely of a single family is unlikely to be considered a church by
the IRS.'16 The existence of a congregation is another form of independent
151 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-37-044 (Sept. 14, 2007).
152 Id. ("[Y]ou are controlled by one individual, M, who is your founder, your sole fi-
nancial donor, your principal sperm donor, one of two related trustees, and one of two related
officers. Thus, taking into account your structure, governance and operations, your activities
result in the provision of more than an incidental level of private benefit to M and his fam-
ily. Therefore, you violate the prohibition in section 1.5 01(c)(3)-I(d)(i)(ii) of the regulations
against impermissible private benefit.").
153 See I.R.C. § 5o(c)(3) (West Supp. 2oo).
154 See I.R.C. § 170(b)(i)(A)(i) (West Supp. 20IO). One recent example of an organiza-
tion that the IRS refused to classify as a church, but was exempt nonetheless as a religious
organization, is the Foundation of Human Understanding whose negative determination of
church status was recently upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Found.
of Human Understanding v. United States, 614 E3 d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
155 See Found. Human Understanding, 614 F.3d at 1390; see also Am. Guidance Found., Inc.
v. United States, 490 F Supp. 304, 306 (D.D.C. 1980) ("At a minimum, a church includes a
body of believers or communicants that assembles regularly in order to worship.").
156 Found. of Human Understanding v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 203, 221-22 (2009),
aff'd, 614 E3d 1383 (Fed. Cit. 2010); see Am. Guidance, 490 F. Supp. at 307 (A family worship-
ping together is "engaged in a quintessentially private religious enterprise" and therefore is
not a church.); Richardson v. Comm'r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 14, at *4 (1995) ("A church cannot,
for federal income tax purposes, consist of just one individual."); Church of Eternal Life and
Liberty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 TC. 916, 927-28 (1986) (holding that a two-person congregation
that makes no effort to expand its size is too small); Church of the Visible Intelligence that
Governs the Universe v. United States (Church of the Visible Intelligence), 4 Cl. Ct. 55, 65 (1983)
("If membership does not extend beyond [the founder's] immediate family, it would appear
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stakeholders that can take the place of multiple donors in providing some
protection against excessive private benefit by organizational insiders.5 7
PLR 2008-30-028"1 and PLR 2008-43-032' involve denials of exempt
status for organizations describing themselves as churches." In PLR
2008-30-028, the IRS determined that an organization that described itself
as "operate[d] for the advancement of Christianity and for other charitable
purposes" was not exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Code and was not
a "church" under section 170(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Code.'"' In holding that the
organization was not a church, the IRS stated,
[y]ou lack all of the significant elements used to determine whether an
organization is a church for tax purposes. You do not have a group of people
who come together on a regular basis and you do not hold regular religious
services. Your organization consists only of four members of a single family
and you do not even hold regular services for those individuals.' 2
The IRS did not discuss the funding of the organization, but it seems
like a fair inference that all the organization's funding came from its four
members. Thus, the organization lacked any meaningful independent
stakeholders such as congregants or donors.
In that context, the IRS held that the organization had a substantial
private purpose. The only facts discussed related to private purpose were
that all the members of the governing board were family members and
the organization had not eschewed the possibility of paying its members
compensation or engaging in other financial transactions with them.'
In PLR 2008-43-032, the IRS similarly determined that an organization
that described its mission as "to carry the whole Gospel of Jesus Christ
to the whole world" was not exempt under section 501(c)(3) and was not
that plaintiff is engaged in a private religious enterprise, rather than a church.").
157 Similarly, a school avoids private foundation status even if it fails all of the pub-
lic support tests, but non-school educational organizations do not. I.R.C. § 509 (West Supp.
20io). That is because schools are required to have regular faculty and a regular student body,
both of which are third-party stakeholders with the potential to keep the school from advanc-
ing impermissible private benefits.
158 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-30-028 (July 25, 2oo8).
159 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-43-032 (Oct. 24, 2oo8).
16o See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-46-040 (Nov. 14, 2oo8) (church or church affiliate
with no identifiable congregation).
161 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-30-028 (July 25, 2008).
I62 Id.
163 See id. at 3, 7. The analysis is somewhat complicated by the fact that the organization
had apparently given very little information to the IRS. For example, the organization had
not adopted any bylaws or a conflict-of-interest policy. Similarly, the organization apparently
provided no financial information, as is required in FORM 1023, and when asked, explained:
"No financial data to report at this time, but in .. . moving forward the church is expecting to
buy equipment.. . and all the things for operating the church." Id. at 4.
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a church under section 170(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Code.'" In this case, the
organization reported that it had ten to twelve participants who regularly
attended worship services and meetings of the organization.16 s Assuming
that the majority of those participants are not related to the founder, this
arguably should constitute a body of independent stakeholders who would
exert some degree of monitoring and control over the founder of the
organization, even if such body is relatively small. The ruling rejected this
reasoning, explaining that even though the organization
has some of the characteristics of a church [presumably that it has
'congregants' who regularly worship together,] no evidence has been
submitted to demonstrate that anyone has achieved the status of becoming
a member with voting rights... .Since there is no membership with voting
rights other than the Pastor and his spouse, it has not been established that
there is a regular congregation of individuals who consider this as their
church,'"
There is no requirement under federal law that members of a church
have any specific sort of "voting rights," and so the IRS's holding on that
score is almost certainly wrong as matter of law. But the IRS's concern with
independent stakeholders such as congregants is notable.
The IRS's discussion of the organization's finances is somewhat
confusing, but it appears that seventy percent of the organization's
funding comes from the Pastor, and it is all paid back to him as a "housing
allowance."'16 The remaining thirty percent came from "certain individuals
and churches."' 6 Thus, the fact that seventy percent of the organization's
income is received from one source-and is spent specifically to provide tax-
free income to that same source-is at least some evidence of a substantial
private purpose. On the other hand, the fact that the remaining thirty percent
of the organization's income is from unrelated charities and persons (if they
are actually unrelated) should be a good sign. That means that almost one-
third of the organization's funding is supplied by independent donors, a
well-recognized category of independent stakeholder. Here, the IRS has
correctly identified relevant information but has not placed it in a context
in which the IRS could evaluate whether the existence of independent
stakeholders was sufficient to allay concerns of excessive private benefit.
164 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-43-032 (Oct. 24, 2008).
165 Id.
i66 Id.
167 Id. The housing allowance is especially troubling, of course, because under federal
law, "ministers of the gospel," but no one else, may be provided with compensation in the
form of a "housing allowance" which does not constitute income to the recipient. I.R.C. § 107
(2oo6). Therefore, if a pastor donates money to a church, which then pays it back to him in
the form of a housing allowance, he has a deduction (for his charitable contribution) without
corresponding income (since the housing allowance is tax-free).
168 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-43-032 (Oct. 24, 2008).
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Thus, the adverse rulings involve situations in which there is. some
evidence that the organization is set up to provide private benefits to its
founders, and in which, there are limited independent stakeholders to
monitor the organization. While the IRS has not necessarily evaluated the
evidence in the most compelling way in each case, each ruling suggests
that both of these concerns are central.
Once the concept of independent stakeholders is introduced, it
becomes clear that an independent board is just one more example of
independent stakeholders who can be expected to monitor the organization
to prevent it from excessively advancing the founder's private purposes.
Just as independent donors have an interest in the charity pursuing its
public purpose, and independent congregants have an interest in a church
pursuing its public purpose, so do independent board members have an
interest in any charity pursuing its public purpose. When an organization
lacks other effective checks on impermissibly advancing private interests,
the IRS is within its authority to insist that the organization adopt some
check, of which board independence of some sort is at least one logical
possibility.
. C. Independent Stakeholders and "Quasi-Commercial" Charities
One significant category of organizations without meaningful
independent stakeholders consists of organizations that get their income
from the performance of their exempt purpose. These organizations do
not have meaningful independent stakeholders but also avoid private
foundation status on account of their "program-related" revenue.
Under section 509(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization
can include gross receipts from the performance of its exempt purpose as
part of its "public support." 69 1In other words, an organization that receives
more than one-third of its support from fees for performance of its exempt
purpose can avoid private foundation status so long as the organization
meets the other requirements.o To illustrate this principle, imagine that
the Fishing Charity did not provide its fishing equipment to poor people
for free but instead sold it to them for a below-market price. The Fishing
Charity would meet the "exempt purpose" test by subsidizing the acquisition
of fishing equipment by the poor, and thereby seeking to eradicate poverty.
Under section 509(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, the Fishing Charity
could count the gross receipts from the sale of fishing equipment as its
"public support." Thus, even if the founder provided all the other financial
support for the organization (either in cash or in-kind in fishing equipment),
169 See I.R.C. § 5o9(a)(2) (2006).
170 Id. § 5o9(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (defining other requirements to include (i) that it otherwise
qualifies for exemption under 501(c)(3) and (2) that it not receive more than one-third of its
support from gross investment income or unrelated business income).
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the organization could potentially avoid private foundation status. Let's
call this organization the Low-Cost Fishing Equipment Charity (see table
below).
The Low-Cost Fishing Equipment Charity avoids private foundation
status because it meets the public-support test on account of the fees
generated from the performance of its tax-exempt purpose. But there is
an argument that the existence of purchasers of low-cost goods-really
beneficiaries of the charity-does not provide the same potential check
on the actions of the charity as would be provided by donors to the
organization."' Likewise, one could argue that the other independent
beneficiaries required to avoid private foundation status-like congregants,
students, regular faculty, patients, doctors, etc.-are more likely to monitor
adequately their organizations than are purchasers of low-cost fishing
equipment."' If the sale of goods or services can produce "public support"
without involving meaningful independent beneficiaries, this is a potential
loophole in the private foundation scheme. The IRS could use its analysis
of independent beneficiaries to identify these organizations and limit
itself to requiring them to expand their boards of directors (or take other
prophylactic action) to lessen the risk of the dominance of a substantial
private purpose.
No
Public Independent
Private Charity With Stakeholders,
Foundation Rules but also
IndependentApply Avoids Private
Stakeholders Fudto
Foundation
Status
No Ongoing Low-Cost
Financial Fishing Fishing Charity Fishing
Transactions Foundation Equipment
Charity
Corporate Low-
Ongoing Corporate Fishing Corporate Cost Fishing
Financial
Transactions Foundation Fishing Charity Equipment
Charity
171 See Leff, supra note 144.
172 See id.
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In fact, several of the organizations described in the following rulings
followed this pattern, and arguably could have avoided private foundation
status without having any meaningful independent stakeholders, such
as donors. I generally call these organizations "quasi-commercial" both
because they generate revenue primarily from selling their (arguably
charitable) services and because the IRS identifies "commerciality" as an
impediment to tax-exempt status in the adverse rulings addressing some
of these organizations."'
For example, in PLR 2008-28-029, the IRS rejected an exemption
application from an organization that intended to purchase mobile home
parks and rent space to needy persons at low rent.'74 The provision of
affordable housing for needy persons has been recognized as a legitimate
tax-exempt purpose under certain circumstances. 7 s The IRS was
concerned that the organization failed to qualify as charitable because it
could not guarantee that the cost to residents would be less than thirty
percent of their income, the measure of "affordability" under the safe-
harbor presented in IRS Revenue Procedure 96-32."76 The organization
argued that it was impossible to guarantee that total costs would be a fixed
percentage of residents' income since the "pad rental" was only a portion
of the residents' overall cost.'
We do not know how the IRS would have handled this argument if the
organization had a truly independent board because the ruling discusses
both a "charitable purpose" problem (no guarantee that housing is
"affordable") and a "private interest" problem (created by the composition
of the organization's board and its relationships with interested persons). 7s
The ruling does not identify which issue is material or how the issues are
weighted. Instead, the ruling simply states, "[w]e do not believe in this
case that you have significant interests that can be distinguished from those
of [the founder] so as to establish that you are not being operated for the
non-exempt purpose of benefiting him.""' The ruling then goes on to
discuss the institutional ways that the founder exerts special control over
the organization. For example, while the board consists of three persons,
the founder was designated as "Founding Director," a special director
173 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-28-029 (July II, zoo8) (discussing the "commerciality"
impediment).
174 Id.
175 See Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. i15; Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-I C.B. 145; Rev. Rul.
79-18, 1979-1 C.B. 194, all of which are cited in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-28-029 (July II,
2008). See also Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717 (describing a safe-harbor and facts and circum-
stances test to determine whether the provision of housing to the poor qualifies as a charitable
purpose) (cited in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-28-029 (July 11, 2008)).
176 See Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-I C.B. 717.
177 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-28-029 (July II, 2oo8).
178 Id.
179 Id.
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who serves a longer term than other directors and can be removed only for
cause.'8 0 Furthermore, the founder is the president of the organization and
appears to be the only person involved in managing the organization.'8 1
The founder also receives compensation from the organization.' 2 The way
that the PLR is redacted makes it difficult to follow the description of the
various financial relationships, but it appears that the founder may stand to
gain financially from the organization's activities in ways other than through
his compensation.'8 In other words, the PLR describes a situation in which
the governing board is dominated by the founder, there is the potential for
the organization to benefit the founder financially, and the organization is
not a private foundation.'"
Under Part III of this Article, this organization would meet the criteria
for the IRS prophylactically requiring a more independent board as a
prerequisite of exemption. But, as this section has discussed, the IRS has
not only been evaluating the criteria described in Part III, but has also been
interested in whether the organization has any meaningful independent
stakeholders. This organization is a classic example of an organization
that will avoid private foundation status, arguably without having any
meaningful independent beneficiaries. The organization expects to fund
its operations through "tax-exempt bonds; space rental income, utility
pass-through income, and, other miscellaneous income from residents;
and, asset management fees.""' Under section 509(a)(2) of the Code, the
space rental income, utility pass-through income, miscellaneous income
from residents, and asset management fees all constitute public support
since they are presumably "gross receipts from ... performance of services,
or furnishing of facilities, in an activity which is not an unrelated trade
i 8o Id.
181 Id. For example, the ruling points out that the founder/president is authorized to
make operational decisions and that bylaws specify that the board is only required to meet
once a year at the annual meeting, thus, calling into question its ability to adequately oversee
the founder/president's actions. Id.
182 Id. There is also evidence that the organization intends to pay the founder in his
role as president, which would presumably be as an employee. Id. ("Your proposed budget
includes compensation of... your president.").
183 See id.
184 The control issue illustrates the difficulty in making a rule about "independent"
directors since the majority of the board is composed of "independent" directors. Even the
founder may be independent under the IRS FORM 99o definition if his compensation is less
than $io,ooo per year and paid to him as a contractor rather than as an employee or if his finan-
cial interest is not in the nature of compensation at all (for example, if it comes from being an
owner of an entity that is engaged in co-ventures with the organization) and it is not excessive.
See FORM 990 INSTRUCTIONs pt. VIA, supra note 32, at 6.
185 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-28-029 (July II, 2oo8). The ruling also states that the
founder "has financed your activities." Id. It is not clear whether the founder intended to
continue to make contributions to the organization, or whether the financing of activities re-
ferred only to startup costs.
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or business.""' So, the organization would not be classified as a private
foundation.
But the organization also would not have meaningful independent
stakeholders in the form of donors, congregants, students, or faculty. What
the organization will have are customers."' The residents of the mobile
home parks that are owned by the organization will pay the organization's
rent, utilities, miscellaneous fees, and management fees. The structure of
section 509(a)(2) of the Code suggests that an organization with multiple
independent customers does not need to be subjected to the special
restrictive rules that apply to private foundations. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to address what makes an independent stakeholder a potentially
meaningful check on the operations of an organization, but it is plausible
that customers do not function in this way. "8 Presumably, customers are
interested only, or primarily, in whether they are receiving the provided
goods or services at a fair price.
Thus, so long as the organization provides the customers with goods
or services at a market (or below market) rate, they are not interested in
whether the directors or managers of the organization enrich themselves.
The customers are especially uninterested in whether the organization's
directors or managers enrich themselves at the expense of the federal fisc. In
fact, so long as the customers receive a portion of any benefit derived from
tax-exemption, they should be perfectly happy to split potential gains with
the organization, its directors, or managers.8 9
Thus, it is plausible that the organization that provides mobile home
spaces for needy persons is exactly the kind of organization that the IRS
should be most worried about: (i) it does not meet the safe-harbor for
providing low-income housing, (ii) the founder has extensive control over
the organization's governing board, (iii) the organization is structured to
potentially engage in multiple transactions with the founder that could
benefit the founder financially, (iv) the organization will avoid private
foundation status, and (v) the organization arguably has no meaningful
independent stakeholders.
186 I.R.C. § 5o9(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2oo6). There is the further requirement that the sums re-
ceived from any one person cannot exceed the greater of $5,ooo or one percent of the orga-
nization's support in any year. Id. As long as there are at least oo residents, paying roughly
equal amounts, this should not be a problem.
187 Admittedly, if it issues tax-exempt bonds, it may have some degree of oversight on
account of the issuance. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate what kind of
oversight comes with the issuance of tax-exempt bonds, presumably that would be an issue
of great interest to the IRS if the existence of third-party stakeholders was relevant to its
determinations of tax-exempt status, and it would be worthwhile for a determinations officer
to investigate [hat issue.
188 See Leff, supra note 144.
189 See id.
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PLR 2008-28-029 is not the only example of an organization that
would simultaneously avoid private foundation status and fail to have any
meaningful independent stakeholders. For example, PLR 2005-14-021190
and PLR 2005-10-03119' both involve organizations that provide some sort
of consumer credit counseling to low-income people. It is worth pointing
out that credit counseling organizations have been the object of intense
scrutiny by the IRS and by Congress, who enacted special rules for credit
counseling organizations in the Pension Protection Act of 2006.192 These
organizations fit the profile described here perfectly: they avoid private
foundation status and make their money from fees from their customers.
Thus, they are subject to abuse if they do not have any check on the actions
of their governing boards, like the kind of safeguard an "independent"
board could potentially provide. PLR 2008-24-025 and PLR 2008-06-021
are other examples of organizations that would presumably avoid private
foundation status because of fees paid by "customers." 93
At least one of the IRS Rulings rejected an application for tax-exempt
status on "commerciality" grounds when it seemed likely that the
organization would get the bulk of its "support" from donations from the
general public under somewhat unusual circumstances. PLR 2007-33-027
involved an organization that planned to solicit donations of used ski boats
from the general public, which it would then repair (if necessary), and sell
at discounted prices to 501(c)(3) camps. 194 The IRS held that
[s]elling boats to non-profit camps is similar to providing adoption services
for a fee and managerial services for a fee, in the sense that they are all
commercial activities usually carried on by for-profit businesses. You will
compete with other commercial boat dealers for the camps' business and,
therefore, there is a distinctive "commercial hue" to the way you propose to
carry out your business.'9
The ruling also notes that the majority (three) of the organization's
governing board was from the same family (although there were also two
independent members), and the chairman received compensation that was
fixed without the benefit of a conflict-of-interest policy."
One way of viewing the ruling is that it is just wrong. But it is also possible
that the ruling could fit within the framework described here. If the receipt
190 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-14-021 (Apr. 8,2005).
191 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-10-031 (Mar. 11, 2005).
192 See Pension Protection Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. io9-280, § 1220, 12o Stat. 780, io86
(2oo6) (codified at I.R.C. § 5oi(q)).
193 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2oo8-24-o25 (June 13, 2oo8); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-o6-
021 (Feb. 8, 2008).
194 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-33-027 (Aug. 17, 2007).
195 Id. (internal citations omitted).
196 Id.
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of in-kind contributions, like the boats donated to this organization, do
not generate the same kind of monitoring by donors as cash contributions,
then the organization would fit the "suspect" class of organizations without
meaningful independent stakeholders that also avoid private foundation
status. The argument is plausible as there has been significant anecdotal
evidence over the last decade or so that taxpayers make in-kind donations,
especially of vehicles and other items, the value of which is easily inflated,
without much concern about the operations of the recipient charities.'
If the IRS explicitly included a discussion of independent stakeholders
in its analysis of the dangers associated with non-independent boards, it
could address whether an organization like this one should be subject to
heightened scrutiny.
The speedboat organization illustrates that the rubric suggested in this
Article could produce disputes. However, the heart of the rubric is as follows:
in cases in which (i) an organization's board is dominated by its founder,
(ii) the founder intends to have ongoing substantial financial dealings with
the organization, (iii) the organization is not a private foundation, and (iv)
the organization has no substantial independent stakeholders, the IRS is
most within its proper sphere to require that the organization provide some
assurance that the organization will not be advanced for a private purpose
and is within its discretion to accept the existence of an independent
board as a minimum qualification for making that assurance. This situation
appears to apply most clearly to organizations that avoid private foundation
status on account of receiving the bulk of their support from fees generated
by their exempt activities-so-called quasi-commercial organizations.
While the IRS appears from the rulings to be already focusing on this type
of organization, the IRS could more clearly guide (and limit) its own actions
by explicitly adopting an approach that took this rubric into account.
V. FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN THE REGULATION OF
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
The absence of independent stakeholders is not only a general problem
from a regulatory perspective. I believe that it also has implications for
federalism concerns that arise from the concurrent jurisdiction of states
and the federal government over the regulation of charities. This Part of
the Article discusses a few very tentative implications that the orientation
toward independent stakeholders may have on thinking about the proper
regulatory reach of the federal government over tax-exempt organizations.
While this section is highly speculative, it appears that the federal
government's emphasis on organizations without meaningful independent
197 For example, these concerns led to the restriction on automobile donations enacted
in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 1o8-357, § 884, I8 Stat. 1418, 1632.
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stakeholders may serve to focus the federal regulatory gaze on those
organizations least likely to be adequately regulated by state charity
regulators.
On the one hand, the difference between the state's regulatory authority
over charities and the federal government's can be described as the
difference between a general mandate arising initially out of the common
law and one tied specifically to the tax code, and therefore with a wholly
statutory origin. The state mandate is broader; the federal mandate is more
specific.' 9 On the other hand, one can describe the state's mandate and the
federal government's as serving somewhat different interests. In general, it
is possible to see that the state's interest in charities is in protecting various
interested citizens from abuse by charities. These interested citizens
include the charitable beneficiaries of a charity and, broadly, the general
public. Also included in the group are other third-parties, such as donors,
congregants, members, and others.' "The federal government, while it may
legitimately share the general interest in protecting stakeholders, is more
fundamentally interested in protecting the federal fisc against abuses of
tax exemption and the deductibility of charitable contributions. 200 These
interests often align, but not always.
State attorneys general are tasked with protecting the interests of
the general public. The public's interests are advanced by ensuring that
the charity serves its charitable purposes faithfully and without waste.
State attorneys general are also tasked with protecting various interests
associated with independent stakeholders. For example, they may protect
the interests of donors by "correcting abuses involving fraudulent charitable
solicitation" and fraud.201 Even when the state is protecting the interests of
198 The federal government's specific mandate reproduces the state's regime, since
every feature of the [federal] excise tax regime ... assumes that reg-
ulating fiduciary behavior through the enforcement of state law fiduciary
duties exclusively by state attorneys general is insufficient to encourage
fiduciaries of charitable entities to behave responsibly. Otherwise, the
federal excise tax system governing compensation paid by each type of
charitable entity would be unnecessary.
Johnny Rex Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions Underlying the Federal Excise Taxation of Compensa-
tion Paidby Charities, 45 REAL PRiOP. PROB. & 1"k. J. 53, 102-03 (2010).
199 The state's interest in protecting interests of stakeholders is reflected in the range
of areas that are the traditional areas of state regulatory concern. See Fishman, supra note
6, at 553 ("Of particular state concern have been the areas of charitable solicitation, fraud,
and breach of fiduciary duties."). In some states, like Texas, the Attorney General's charity
regulators are a subsection of the general consumer protection division.
200 See, e.g., Ingram 2oo9 Speech, supra note 6, at 2 ("[Tlhe IRS does have the very clear
obligation to see that the tax subsidy that the tax-exempt community enjoys-estimated by
the Office of Management and Budget to be billions of dollars per year-is used properly, for
the purposes and within the parameters the Congress has laid down.").
201 Fishman, supra note 6, at 556.
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the general public by monitoring the charitable objectives of the charity,
the state may be connected to a mission of protecting donors against fraud
or waste of their charitable donations. Even when state charity regulators
are acting proactively and conscientiously, they may focus their attention
on those charities that deceive donors or waste donated assets. Thus, the
state charity regulators may be focused on those organizations that have
numerous independent stakeholders (like donors). Organizations that do
not have independent stakeholders, like quasi-commercial organizations,
or private foundations, may not be the most important focus of state charity
regulators.
Federal interests, however, may be somewhat different. Because the
federal government provides a tax exemption and a tax deduction for
donations to charitable organizations, it has a financial interest in charitable
organizations.zo' Presumably, the government provides the exemption and
deduction to assist organizations in pursuing their charitable missions.
But when an organization has no independent stakeholders, the federal
government has no allies that can assist in protecting the organization
against abusive insider transactions. Meaningful independent stakeholders
who have no financial interest in a charitable organization are potentially
very useful to the federal government because they share the federal
government's interest in monitoring the organization and keeping it true
to its charitable mission.20 So, the federal government may best serve
its own interests by focusing its regulatory gaze on organizations without
independent stakeholders because independent stakeholders can monitor
organizations with which they are associated.
Thus, the existence or lack of independent stakeholders highlights
the times when the federal government's interest may be stark, while the
state's interest may be minimal. That is, when there are no independent
stakeholders, the federal government may be most worried because the
lack of disinterested donors or others willing to devote time to a cause may
be evidence that the cause is not truly charitable or that private purposes
dominate. On the other hand, when there are no independent stakeholders,
the state may be least worried because the potential victims of the charity's
abusive behavior are fewer or less visible. No donors are being defrauded;
no volunteers are being abused; no members' interests are being ignored;
no minority directors are being bullied. Of course, the fiduciary duties
enforceable by the state attorneys general are arguably duties owed to
202 The federal government's interest in 501(c)(3) organizations is higher than its gen-
eral interest in the activities of other exempt organizations, because (c)(3) organizations are
generally permitted tax-deductible contributions under section 170 of the Internal Revenue
Code. As Fishman points out, the argument that exempt organizations receive a "subsidy"
from the federal government is strongest in the case of organizations that receive tax-deduct-
ible contributions. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 557.
203 See Leff, supra note 144, at 26-30.
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charitable beneficiaries or the general public.2m But a charity with no
meaningful independent stakeholders may not even have well-defined
beneficiaries, thereby decreasing the state's interest in expending resources
to regulate it more. When the only identifiable beneficiaries are the general
public, the duty may be attenuated and undefined enough that states may
lack a will or an operative theory of how or when to regulate it. The point
is that organizations with no meaningful independent stakeholders are low
on the state's priority list but high on the federal government's priority list in
both cases because of the lack of independent stakeholders. Thus, a federal policy
of explicitly theorizing the effect of turning independent stakeholders into
regulatory priorities should simultaneously serve the interest of rational
regulation and addressing federalism concerns.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to argue that the IRS may be justified
in requiring exempt organizations to have an independent board, or some
independent board members, but only under very narrow circumstances.
First, the IRS must find that an organization has the potential to advance
a substantial private purpose. It does this at least partially by identifying
organizations (i) whose governing boards are dominated by their founders,
and (ii) who intend to engage in ongoing financial transactions with those
founders/directors. Under its own policies, the IRS then should (iii) exclude
any organization that is a private foundation. But this initial identification
is arguably not sufficient to require that an organization expand its board to
include independent members.
Once the IRS has identified organizations that it thinks pose a
potential danger of being operated to advance a substantial private
purpose, an analysis of meaningful independent stakeholders can assist
an evaluation of whether conditioning exemption on the existence of
some sort of "independent" board is warranted. When an organization has
donors, volunteers, or congregants who have no financial interest in the
organization, they can ensure that the organization serves a public purpose,
and therefore that it does not serve a substantial private purpose. Indeed,
Congress has seen fit to recognize expressly the importance of independent
stakeholders and make them a part of the very structure of the Code.
Independent board members are just another potential independent
stakeholder. Therefore, while the IRS may reasonably use the existence
of independent board members as the pivotal check on excessive private
purposes under certain limited circumstances, it should do so only when
other independent stakeholders are absent.
2o4 See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 301 (2004).
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Finally, if the IRS incorporates an analysis of independent stakeholders
into its regulatory decision-making, it should have salutary effects on
federalism concerns. It is exactly those organizations without independent
stakeholders that are likely to avoid state regulation and that are central to
the federal government's interest in regulating charities, namely protection
of the federal fisc.
In the final analysis, whether the IRS is authorized to require any
organizations to change the composition of their boards of directors is a
question of federal law. Because of that, Congress could act to clarify the
IRS's mandate. This Article has argued that the cautious approach that the
IRS appears to be taking currently-the "middle way"-has benefits. If
Congress were to act, it would have to choose whether to support the current
approach or replace that approach with a new approach. If it acted to further
the current approach, Congress could potentially improve the enforcement
of restrictions on private benefits by clarifying the relationship between
independent stakeholders and the private foundation excise tax regime.
It could also enhance the restrictions on transactions between private
foundations and disqualified persons. Either of these areas of reform could
continue the balance between federal interests, state interests, and charity
autonomy that is reflected in the "middle way."
On the other hand, Congress could instead accept recommendations
to add broadly applicable minimum requirements for board independence
that would apply to all (or substantially all) charities. 0 This latter approach
would be more invasive to charity autonomy, more transgressive of state
regulatory authority, and less consistent with the current balance of
interests expressed under current law. The IRS's "middle way" is better.
205 See, e.g., INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 8, at 4.
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